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MEDICARE “BANKRUPTCY”
MATTHEW B. LAWRENCE *
Abstract: Medicare, the social insurance program for the elderly and disabled, is
once again facing insolvency. Spending from the program’s hospital insurance
trust fund is predicted to exceed the accumulated payroll taxes and other revenues that support the fund within the next five years, leaving Medicare unable to
honor some of its obligations. Yet, what happens if and when Medicare becomes
insolvent has not previously been explored in legal scholarship and is not addressed in statute or regulation. This Article confronts for the first time the major
legal questions that Medicare insolvency would present. It explains what policymakers could do to make insolvency less unfair, less harmful, less likely, and
more effective as a tool to promote compromise and cost control in the program.
In short, this Article argues for the establishment, by law, of rules to govern Medicare bankruptcy.
The Article’s analysis of how an insolvent Medicare program would work reveals several unsettled legal questions, resolution of which would determine insolvency’s harms, who would pay them, and when. Uncertainty surrounding the
consequences of insolvency would be problematic from the ex-post perspective
because it would increase the unfairness and magnitude of the associated harms.
Further, such uncertainty is already problematic from the ex-ante perspective of a
program in a five-decade cycle of insolvency because it inhibits compromise and
disincentivizes Medicare’s powerful industry constituents from using their influence to promote cost control. In developing this normative insight, this Article
for the first time applies the structural, ex-ante theoretical perspective developed
in the municipal bankruptcy literature to the law and political economy of a federal spending program. It concludes by addressing the roles of Congress, the Department of Health and Human Services, and courts in clarifying the consequences of Medicare insolvency. Although a partial framework could and should
be established by regulation in the short term, this Article calls for a Medicare
bankruptcy provision ultimately to be included as a failsafe in future legislation,
if and when it comes, to address the current crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
According to fable, a frog tossed in boiling water will quickly hop out,
but a frog placed in tepid water will remain, even as the water is slowly
warmed, oblivious to the creeping threat until the frog is boiled alive. 1 The
United States is currently engaged in an unplanned, high stakes experiment to
test the truth of this fable, with a slightly different setup. The frog is Medicare,
the federal health care program for sixty-three million elderly and disabled
Americans, 2 and the warming water is the program’s approaching insolvency. 3
Medicare is predicted to become insolvent within five years. 4 All reserves
will eventually deplete as the payroll taxes that primarily fund the program will
be insufficient to pay the claims of the hospitals and insurers who meet the
health care needs of the nation’s elderly. 5 This is the fifth time in five decades
that the program has faced insolvency within six years, 6 but the program has
never been closer to insolvency than it is now. 7 Moreover, what once seemed
unthinkable now seems increasingly plausible: Medicare may actually go “bank1
See, e.g., What Is the Fable of the Boiling Frog?, DAILY MAIL (MAR. 4, 2019), https://www.
dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/fb-6769921/WHAT-FABLE-BOILING-FROG.html [https://perma.cc/
8SDW-9UDL] (explaining the use of the boiling frog fable as a metaphor for a failure to react to slow
and steady change).
2
PATRICIA A. DAVIS & PHOENIX VOORHIES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10885, MEDICARE OVERVIEW (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10885 [https://perma.cc/U4LM-YCNH].
3
See, e.g., Sarah O’Brien, Medicare’s Trust Fund Faces Insolvency in 2026. Here’s How That
Squares with Democrats’ Efforts to Expand the Health Insurance Program, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/12/democrats-aim-to-expand-medicare-despite-looming-trust-fundinsolvency.html [https://perma.cc/WGL7-67UU] (reporting a projection of Medicare insolvency by
2026).
4
Id. The most authoritative predictions come from the Board of Trustees of the Trust Fund (Trustees), a group consisting of two presidential appointees (currently vacant) along with the Commissioner of Social Security and the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, and Health & Human Services, that is
required by statute to report annually on Medicare’s financial status. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(b). The Trustees’ most recent estimate, issued August 31, 2021, predicted insolvency in 2026, which is consistent
with a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline report. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS.
& FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2021 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS 8 (2021), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/2021-medicare-trustees-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ME92-P7KU]; CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2021
TO 2031, at 4–9 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-02/56970-Outlook.pdf [https://perma.
cc/KGQ3-66C8].
5
See PATRICIA A. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20946, MEDICARE: INSOLVENCY PROJECTIONS 1–3, 8, 12 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20946.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG6P-N4K6]
(describing insolvency as when the assets credited to the trust fund reach zero).
6
See id. at 4 fig.1 (indicating that insolvency was projected to be within six or fewer years in
1970–72, 1982, 1993, and 1996–97).
7
Richard G. Frank & Tricia Neuman, Opinion, Addressing the Risk of Medicare Trust Fund Insolvency, 325 JAMA 341, 341 (2021) (“Congress has addressed insolvency in the past but never on
such a tight deadline.”).
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rupt.” 8 Four overlapping trends support this pessimistic conclusion, despite
Medicare’s traditional political sanctity. Prior Medicare insolvency “crises” were
resolved only by the passage of major bipartisan health reform legislation.9 This
appears unlikely today, especially given analysts’ predictions that this time, extending the program’s life will require unprecedented changes to its financing
structure. 10 In health law, Congress has increasingly failed to enact funding
needed to honor entitlements, thereby “disappropriating” 11 tribal contract support costs, 12 the Children’s Health Insurance Program,13 and Affordable Care Act
8
See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 3, 7 (describing that although the Medicare “[T]rust [F]und has never become insolvent,” current projections indicate insolvency by early 2026). It is common in health
policy to object that an insolvent Medicare would not actually be “bankrupt.” See generally Paul N.
Van de Water, Medicare Is Not “Bankrupt,” CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, https://www.
cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-12-11health.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASU8-EMB3] (May 1,
2019) (characterizing “claims by some policymakers” that Medicare is going “bankrupt” as misrepresentative); THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 135 (2d ed. 2000) (“[N]o precise
analog to private bankruptcy exists in public programs like Medicare.”). This objection is fair in the
sense that the program would still have significant revenue and be able to pay most of its liabilities
even if insolvent, and thus would not be “bankrupt” in the colloquial sense of the word that means
“having no assets or revenue.” See Bankruptcy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (describing that in legal parlance, one is “bankrupt” who is “without enough money to pay back what one
owes,” and “bankruptcy” itself refers to “[a] statutory procedure by which a . . . debtor obtains financial relief and undergoes a judicially supervised reorganization or liquidation of [their] assets for the
benefit of creditors”). It is also fair in the sense that insolvency would not change Medicare beneficiaries’ entitlement to services from Medicare providers and insurers; it would instead impact reimbursement for those providers and insurers with important, but indirect, effects on patients. See discussion infra Section III.A. In this sense, this Article explains, Medicare would indeed be “bankrupt” if it
became insolvent, and this Article’s central thesis is that an explicit bankruptcy framework for Medicare
should be created before the program actually becomes insolvent. See discussion infra Part III.
9
See, e.g., David Muhlestein, The Coming Crisis for the Medicare Trust Fund, HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201210.997063/full/ [https://
perma.cc/V5NK-SKD9] (describing the “major federal legislation” required to resolve past insolvency
crises). Whether the approach of insolvency is properly understood as a “crisis” has been disputed.
See MARMOR, supra note 8, at 136 (describing insolvency as a “thermometer[]”). Nonetheless, that
understanding is pervasive and influential, explaining its employment in this Article while developing
a richer picture of how insolvency would work in Medicare. This Article further seeks to supplant
superficial understandings based only on rhetoric with a more nuanced approach. Cf. JONATHAN
OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 75 (2003) (“[T]rust fund crises are political events
whose solutions reflect contemporary partisan alignments, ideological commitments, and policy analysts’ thinking about what represents the solution du jour in the health system.” (emphasis added)).
10
See, e.g., Paul N. Van de Water, Strengthening Medicare Financing: General Revenues Should
Be Part of the Solution, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.cbpp.
org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-14-20health.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7K9-82VZ] (“Phasing in
spending cuts of [the] magnitude [of Medicare’s projected deficit over a decade] in such a few years
would not be feasible—or desirable.”).
11
Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4, 9, 29 (2020). “Disappropriation” is defined as “the phenomenon of congressional failure to appropriate funds necessary to
honor a government commitment.” Id. at 24 (citing Disappropriation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 8).
12
Id. at 9, 27–30 (describing how “Congress failed to appropriate sufficient funds to the Secretary
of Interior to reimburse tribes” who had “elected to operate their own services under the [Indian Self-
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(ACA) subsidies.14 In fiscal law, Congress has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge of budgetary pressures and enact “must pass” legislation, often reverting to
short-term patches that lead to impasse. 15 The debt ceiling debate, looming once
again as of this writing, illustrates this pattern. 16 And politically, an era of “hardball” sees the party opposing the president looking to use their influence in Congress to frustrate governance by any means necessary. 17
Medicare’s chances of bucking these trends are further diminished by the
legal framework governing the program’s insolvency—or lack thereof. As definitive as headlines make it sound, without action, the implications of insolvency in Medicare would be uncertain at the outset and slow to develop. What
would actually happen to hospital and insurer reimbursement 18 if Medicare
Determination and Education Act]” (first citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-99-150, INDIAN
SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: SHORTFALLS IN INDIAN CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 3 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-99-150.pdf [https://perma.cc/482E-J8TD]; and
then citing Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 187 (2012))).
13
Id. at 9, 37–39 (describing how, after “[t]he two-year appropriation for [the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP)] enacted in 2015 ran out,” temporary funding measures were only enacted
nearly twelve weeks later (citing Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-10, § 301, 129 Stat. 154)).
14
See id. at 9, 30–37 (describing how a rider “limit[ed] the availability of [program management]
appropriation for risk corridor payments,” which “left [Health and Human Services] without sufficient
. . . appropriations” to pay insurers under the program, as the ACA required, and how Congress’s
failure to appropriate new funds for cost-sharing reduction payments led to the stoppage of such payments).
15
See, e.g., Thomas Franck, Lawmakers Have a Deal on a Short-Term Debt Ceiling Increase,
Senate Majority Leader Schumer Says, CNBC (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/07/law
makers-reach-deal-on-short-term-debt-ceiling-increase-schumer-says.html [https://perma.cc/CY2XYJRA] (reporting on the Senate Majority Leader’s announcement that a short-term deal extending the
debt ceiling for an additional two months had been reached).
16
See, e.g., Katia Dmitrieva, Treasury to Start Special Measures to Avoid Breaching Debt Limit,
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-30/treasury-to-startspecial-measures-to-avoid-breaching-debt-limit [https://perma.cc/A6VX-TFDD] (“Congress still lacks
a clear plan for averting default later this year.”).
17
Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
915, 921–22, 980 (2018) (“[G]reater use of constitutional hardball . . . tend[s] to increase even further
the use of constitutional hardball . . . as members of both parties successively shred cooperative
norms, shrink the space for bipartisan policy solutions, and make governance more difficult . . . .”).
There is an argument about whether this phenomenon is asymmetric—perhaps more common among,
or more useful to, Republicans—but even skeptics of hardball’s asymmetry do not deny its growing
prevalence. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Response, Constitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So
Much, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 207, 220–22 (2018), https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/12/Bernstein-CONSTITUTIONAL_HARDBALL_YES_ASYMMETRIC_NOT_SO_
MUCH.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFH3-LDHL] (arguing that constitutional hardball is not more common
among Republicans than Democrats).
18
Reimbursement for outpatient care and prescription drugs through Medicare is not dependent
on the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and so would not be directly disrupted in in the event of insolvency. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining how the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund only pays for
the benefits provided through Part A of Medicare); infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (explain-
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reaches insolvency has not previously been explored in any public forum, 19 not
even in the robust legal literature focused on the program’s finances. 20 But this
Article’s first-ever analysis of what administering insolvency would entail reveals that the advent of insolvency in the program would be more like a slowrising boil than a “jump or die” event. Specifically, this Article isolates and
analyzes five key open legal questions facing the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and courts. The answers to these questions could take
years to emerge and would determine the harms of insolvency, who would bear
them, when they would materialize, and the “deadline” to avoid them. 21 Hence
ing the types of services and providers that are reimbursed through the Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund).
19
The author is unaware of any treatment of the subject, public or private. A Congressional Research Service report on Medicare insolvency projections is illustrative of this gap. In a section titled
“What Would Happen If the Fund Became Insolvent?,” the report simply notes that “[t]here are no
provisions in the [Medicare statute] that govern what would happen if insolvency were to occur.”
DAVIS, supra note 5, at 8. As Part II of this Article elaborates, that is not quite true; there are no explicit provisions of law addressing insolvency in Medicare (this Article argues there should be), but
HHS’s administration of insolvency would be subject to many generally applicable legal requirements
in the U.S. Constitution, the Medicare statute, and the Administrative Procedure Act. See discussion
infra Part II. Some treatments do address the distinctive question of what might happen if the Social
Security Trust Fund—which reimburses beneficiaries directly, not through intermediaries as does
Medicare—were to run out. See, e.g., John Harrison, New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal
Constitution, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 401,
406–07 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) (discussing the lack
of clarity surrounding implications of insolvency in Social Security).
20
A growing literature discusses the Medicare program and its financial situation, but it has not
addressed what would happen should the program become insolvent. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519 (2013) (arguing for reform efforts that align the practice patterns of private physicians with federal priorities in administering Medicare); Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (2016) (arguing that giving providers fiduciary duty
to payers would “better protect the fiscal health of the Medicare program”); Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2010)
(advocating for a framework that allows Medicare coverage for new technologies to be evaluated
explicitly based on costs as opposed to implicitly as is done now); Jill R. Horwitz, The Virtues of
Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (2008) (reviewing DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006)) (critiquing David A. Hyman’s characterization of the Medicare program); David
A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003) (comparing the
Medicare program to a satanic scheme intent on “undermin[ing] . . . American virtues”); Mark A.
Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 75 (2020) (discussing the interaction between Medicare reimbursement and pharmaceutical
innovation). As Section III.C. explains, the question of what would happen in the event of insolvency
in Medicare is itself an upstream, ex ante determinant of the program’s policies, finances, and performance that operates whether or not the insolvency point is actually reached. See discussion infra Section III.C.
21
See discussion infra Part II (exploring the questions: (1) when and how to promulgate Medicare
policy addressing administration in the event of bankruptcy; (2) whether to pay claims in full but
subject to an increasingly-long delay or to pay all claims as usual but reduced pro rata; (3) whether to
insulate some claimants from insolvency’s effects; (4) whether shorted providers could obtain recov-
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this Article’s thesis: HHS, or preferably Congress, should establish Medicare
bankruptcy rules in advance to make insolvency less unfair, less harmful, less
likely, and, a more effective tool for controlling cost and promoting quality in
health care. 22
That it would be good to make insolvency less unfair, less harmful, and
less likely presumably goes without saying, but the idea of making insolvency
a more effective tool requires elaboration. The establishment of rules for Medicare bankruptcy would offer an opportunity to address a problem in Medicare’s political economy that scholars have noted contributes to the program’s
underlying cycle of insolvency. 23 Medicare’s political economy encourages
concentrated lobbying interests—including hospitals, insurers, pharmaceutical
companies, and beneficiaries—to use their influence to steer the program’s policy toward greater spending between solvency crises, for better or worse. 24 They
do so effectively (though not always successfully), in the administrative process,
in congress, and in court. 25 This is one reason that solutions to prior Medicare
insolvency crises have inevitably proven temporary, and that the nation has consistently failed to control health care costs in Medicare and beyond. 26
The threat of insolvency has a potentially salutary role to play in this dynamic interaction between politics and law. Like the debt ceiling (which has
not yet been hit) or annual shutdowns (which repeatedly have occurred), the
mere possibility of insolvency in Medicare drives legislative change, and expectations about the consequences of insolvency influence the shape those
changes take. This makes it important to consider critically the consequences
of insolvency even if those consequences never arrive.
ery from the Judgment Fund; and (5) whether any such recovery would come through prospective
injunctions in federal district courts or retrospective damages orders in the court of federal claims).
22
This Article focuses on the benefits of clarity, all else being equal, but it is important to note
that those benefits could be outweighed if the clarification adopted by Congress or HHS was itself
problematic. See discussion infra Section III.C. (describing the possibilities); infra Part IV (recommending particular clarifications).
23
See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (describing the law and political economy problem). On the concept and field of law and political economy, see generally Jedediah Britton-Purdy,
David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy
Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (outlining a new
approach for legal scholarship employing the law and political economy approach).
24
See, e.g., Zack Cooper, Amanda Kowalski, Eleanor Neff Powell & Jennifer Wu, Politics and
Health Care Spending in the United States 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
23748, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23748/w23748.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2HZH-SU82] (describing the lobbying efforts by the healthcare industry to increase Medicare
payments).
25
See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (describing how Medicare’s political economy
problem allows industry players to wield undue influence over the direction of the program).
26
See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (explaining further that the constant temporary
Medicare fixes and rising healthcare costs are the result of this political economy problem).
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Specifically, the threat of insolvency alone could, if properly calibrated,
mitigate the biasing influence of providers, insurers, and pharmaceutical companies by altering their incentives—changing how they wield their influence as
opposed to their ability to do so. As municipal bankruptcy literature teaches,
making it clear that the most powerful constituents have skin in the game (so
to speak) of Medicare’s solvency would combat their moral hazard. 27 Further,
it would encourage them to use their clout to protect, and not just undermine,
the program’s long-term fiscal health—perhaps even by promoting long-term
population health. Clear Medicare bankruptcy rules, established ex-ante rather
than ex-post, could change the program’s political economy, encouraging powerful interests to direct Medicare away from the boiling pot, rather than into it.
The stakes are so high, and numbers in the Medicare program so large, they
can sometimes begin to seem more technical than human. But Medicare’s insolvency would touch the lives of almost every American, potentially transforming
the country’s health, welfare, and governance. The program is the linchpin of our
health care system, and of many communities. Its roughly sixty million beneficiaries depend on it for medical care. 28 The nation’s 6,023 hospitals, fifteen
thousand nursing homes, and nearly five thousand hospice facilities depend on it
to remain afloat. 29 Finally, the communities they serve depend on it for the jobs
and economic lifeline that Medicare providers bring. 30 Medicare insolvency
would eventually impact all those who rely on Medicare. As this Article explains, the legal and policy choices made in operationalizing insolvency, if and
when it comes, will determine who among these groups pays, and how much.
What’s more, trust fund insolvency would have transformative ramifications beyond Medicare itself. Across the health care system, disruptions in
Medicare reimbursement would trigger hospital consolidation, cuts to charitable care, private sector insurance premium increases, and more vigorous medical bill collection activity. 31 All of these effects would reduce affordability and
David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State
and Local Budget Crises 5–6 (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3649278 [https://perma.cc/JGS9-959J] (discussing the federal government’s options in avoiding state
debt crises).
28
Lemley et al., supra note 20, at 82.
29
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MDCR PROVIDERS 1: MEDICARE PROVIDERS:
NUMBER OF MEDICARE CERTIFIED INSTITUTIONAL PROVIDERS, CALENDAR YEARS 2014–2019
(2019), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/2019cpsmdcrproviders1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL2G98SX] (providing the national count of such providers as of 2019).
30
AM. HOSP. ASS’N, RURAL REPORT: CHALLENGES FACING RURAL COMMUNITIES AND THE
ROADMAP TO ENSURE LOCAL ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY, AFFORDABLE CARE 2 (2019), https://
www.aha.org/system/files/2019-02/rural-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ER2-QPZ9].
31
Medicare subsidizes care for the indigent, undocumented immigrants, and all others who slip
through the cracks of our health care system to become “uninsured.” It is through Medicare that hospitals are required to treat any patient, regardless whether they have insurance, and through Medicare
27
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increase inequity in a health care system that is already unaffordable and deeply inequitable. 32 In politics, insolvency would support an argument and perception—justified or not—that government-sponsored health care is financially
unsustainable. 33 Medicare’s existing cycle of insolvency is already cited as an
argument against “Medicare for All” or other expanded government programs—actually reaching insolvency would supercharge such arguments. 34 In
fiscal law, where inter-generational, inter-class, and inter-sector fights about
resource allocation play out, the choices made by Congress, courts, and HHS
in administering insolvency would determine whether Medicare continues to
have a privileged status. 35 If not, it must instead compete directly going forward with those seeking higher wages, profits, or spending on social programs
such as public health and education. 36 Finally, the threat of insolvency in Medthat hospitals that disproportionately serve such uninsured patients are reimbursed for doing so. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (requiring medical screening from hospitals regardless of whether the individual is eligible for Medicare); id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I) (authorizing “additional payment[s]” for
providers that “ serve[ ] a significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients”). Disrupted
reimbursement due to insolvency in Medicare would prompt hospitals to cut these services, along with
other impacts listed above. See discussion infra Section III.A.
32
See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Matthew B. Lawrence & Erin C.
Fuse Brown, Health Reform Reconstruction, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3760086# [https://perma.cc/65DM-YHPF] (describing
the deep inequities in the U.S. healthcare system).
33
THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter & Theda Skocpol eds., 1995) (“Prior policies
may be seen as models to be extended or imitated; or they may be seen as ‘bad’ examples to be avoided in the future.”).
34
See, e.g., Seth J. Chandler, Foreword: Medicare for All: The Need for a Long Approach, 20
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2020) (“It might . . . be more persuasive to expand Medicare to a
much larger population right away if that particular program were financially stable.”); Susan Adler
Channick, Will Americans Embrace Single-Payer Health Insurance: The Intractable Barriers of Inertia, Free Market, and Culture, 28 LAW & INEQ. 1, 35 (2010) (“That Medicare . . . is perpetually on the
verge of insolvency makes a universal social insurance system predictably frightening to legislators
and voters alike.” (footnote omitted) (citing T.W. Farnam, Social Security, Medicare Face Insolvency
Sooner, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124212734686110365
[https://perma.cc/KP8E-HK2K])); see also MARMOR, supra note 8, at 137 (stating that trust fund
financing is “one of [the] greatest political vulnerabilities [of Medicare] and the nominal foundation to
support the attacks of the program’s harshest critics” (citation omitted)). In the Democratic presidential primary, the aspect of “Medicare for All” that proved pivotal—for the program and for its proponents, especially Senator Elizabeth Warren—was inquiry about its financing. See Peter Sullivan, Warren Takes Fire from Rivals on Cost of ‘Medicare for All,’ THE HILL (Oct. 15, 2019), https://thehill.
com/policy/healthcare/465979-warren-takes-fire-from-rivals-on-cost-of-medicare-for-all [https://
perma.cc/5G2L-56NM].
35
See generally Matthew B. Lawrence, Coronavirus Reveals the Fiscal Determinants of Health,
in COVID-19 AND THE LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Abbe Gluck, Katherine Kraschel & Carmel Schachar
eds.) (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (surveying the role of fiscal law in health law and policy).
36
See Matthew B. Lawrence, Subordination and Separation of Powers, 131 YALE L.J. 78, 112
(2021) (describing the privileged status of Medicare vis-a-vis other health programs in current fiscal
arrangements); see also infra notes 177–209, 331–344 and accompanying text (describing how the
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icare shapes the very political economy of health care. The formulation of insolvency rules, if done carefully, thus offers a rare chance to address the role
that wealth plays in shaping health policy in the United States. 37
This Article’s contribution is descriptive, normative, theoretical, and prescriptive. Its descriptive contribution is to detail and analyze the key questions
the Medicare program will face if it reaches insolvency and the provisions of
Medicare law, administrative law, and constitutional law governing those
choices. Its normative contribution is to explain that advance resolution of
these questions by law would predictably reduce the likelihood that Medicare
would actually become insolvent and the resulting harms and unfairness. Its
theoretical contribution is to consider whether the threat of insolvency could
play a more effective role in health policy—if it must play any role at all. Clarifying these consequences may combat the moral hazard of the powerful economic interests who influence the program’s policy between solvency crises.
Finally, its prescriptive contribution is to recommend specific actions that
HHS, Congress, and courts should take to clarify the consequences of insolvency in Medicare before it is too late.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background about the
Medicare program and its ongoing cycle of insolvency. 38 It also describes reasons for skepticism that Congress will enact legislation that addresses the program’s solvency on more than a short-term basis, if it even does that.
Part II addresses how an insolvent Medicare program might be administered under current law. 39 Recent congressional failures to appropriate funds
necessary to honor commitments in the ACA and Medicaid programs reveal
that the harms of such failures depend very much on the details. 40 Building on
these precedents, Part II systematically isolates and analyzes the key choices
posed by Medicare bankruptcy, including: (1) the administrative process by
which to set insolvency policy; (2) whether to delay payments or reduce them
pro rata; (3) whether to insulate some claimants, such as hospitals that serve
many indigent patients; (4) whether courts could order shorted providers reimbursed through the “Judgment Fund”; and (5) if so, which courts should do so
and when. 41

question of Judgment Fund availability would determine whether Medicare would continue to enjoy
privileged status post-insolvency).
37
See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 23, at 1829–32 (describing the stubbornness of economic
power and the difficulty of curbing its influence through law).
38
See infra notes 46–109 and accompanying text.
39
See infra notes 110–231 and accompanying text.
40
See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 27 (describing controversies resulting from congressional failure to fund certain Affordable Care Act and Medicaid entitlements).
41
See infra notes 110–231 and accompanying text.
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Part III develops this Article’s thesis that the consequences of insolvency
in Medicare should be clarified in advance. 42 From the ex-post perspective of
an insolvent program, clarity would reduce the unfairness and harms of Medicare bankruptcy. From the ex-ante perspective of a program in the midst of
another insolvency crisis, rules established in advance could reduce the likelihood of actual insolvency in the short term (by facilitating compromise in
Congress). Additionally, advance rulemaking may help break Medicare free of
its underlying cycle of insolvency in the long term (by combatting the moral
hazard of the powerful economic interests that influence Medicare policy).
Part IV offers prescriptions for HHS, Congress, and courts. 43 HHS could
create significant value by establishing a Medicare bankruptcy framework by
regulation, but the greatest potential lies in a legislative framework created by
Congress. Despite courts’ roles being secondary, Part IV explains that by emphasizing predictability in interpreting the Medicare statute, courts can both
further the goal of clarifying the consequences of Medicare insolvency and
honor congressional intent. 44 The question of Chevron deference in Medicare,
which the Supreme Court began considering in the October Term 2021, illustrates the relevance of this prescription. 45 Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the Article’s contribution.
I. THE FAULT IN MEDICARE’S STARS
Medicare is a federal program that covers health care costs for the elderly
and disabled, as well as those with end-stage kidney disease. 46 It covers eligible hospital costs, outpatient care, and pharmaceuticals costs, among other
benefits. 47 Scholars rightly describe it as a “cornerstone” of social policy in the
United States, and prominent health reform proposals have made Medicare
their foundation. 48 It was created in 1965 as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society.” 49
See infra notes 232–327 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 328–363 and accompanying text.
44
See infra notes 328–363 and accompanying text.
45
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 967 F.3d 818 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Hosp.
Ass’n v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021); see discussion infra Section IV.B (analyzing a number of
cases evaluating Medicare financing which illustrate the role judicial decision-making plays in ensuring predictability when insolvency occurs).
46
What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/yourmedicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare [https://perma.cc/YEF2-9L4W].
47
DAVIS, supra note 5, at 1.
48
See Isaac D. Buck, The Meaning of “Medicare-for-All,” 20 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 159,
161 (2020) (“[T]he national narrative has focused on insurance access through ‘Medicare-for-All[]’
. . . .”); William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 461
(1996) (“Medicare rests as the cornerstone of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society.” (footnote omitted));
42
43
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The nation’s elderly and disabled are the costliest groups to provide with
health care. The heart of Medicare’s financing for this care is the “trust fund”
system pioneered in Frances Perkins’ Social Security program. 50 In Medicare’s
version of this system, a payroll tax is levied against the income of all Americans
and deposited into a designated Treasury account labeled the “Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund” (Trust Fund), separate from general revenues; Congress
has appropriated this account, in turn, as the source of payment for about half of
Medicare costs. 51 These include payments to hospitals, nursing homes, hospice
care, Medicare Advantage insurers (or “Part C” insurers), and many others. 52
This structure contributes to the political legitimacy of Medicare and its robust
enrollment, as beneficiaries see the program not as government largesse but as
an entitlement they “earned” through payroll tax contributions. 53 That said, a
plurality of Medicare costs are not financed through the Trust Fund but instead
from other sources. These include outpatient medical costs (whether incurred
at a doctor’s office or a hospital), and pharmaceutical costs that are paid from a
different account not dependent on payroll contributions, the “Supplemental

Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1121 (2003)
(describing Medicare’s role as a “centerpiece” of the Balance Budget Act of 1997).
49
See generally Dauster, supra note 48; Medicare Signed into Law, U.S. SENATE, https://www.
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Medicare_Signed_Into_Law.htm#:~:text=On%20July%20
30%2C%201965%2C%20President,Harry%20Truman%20had%20proposed%20it [https://perma.cc/
D8KK-2U9M].
50
The Social Security program is ordinarily associated with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
but Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, the first female cabinet secretary, was more primarily responsible for the program’s development and implementation. See Social Security History: Social Security
Pioneers: Frances Perkins, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/fperkins.html [https://perma.
cc/CUS5-HCUD] (describing the role of Secretary Perkins in the implementation of the Social Security program).
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(b).
52
Id. § 1395ww(b), § 1395cc(a) (hospitals); id. § 1395yy(h) (skilled nursing facilities); id.
§ 1395w-23(f) (insurers participating in Part C); id. § 1395ww(h) (graduate medical centers); id.
§ 1395l(f) (community health clinics); id. § 1395g(a)–(e) (hospices); id. § 1395b-1(a)(1) (“[P]ublic or
private agencies, institutions, and organizations . . . develop[ing] and engag[ing] in experiments and
demonstration projects . . . .”); id.§ 1395b-4(a) (states receiving grants under the State Health Insurance Assistant Program (SHIP) for “providing information, counseling, and assistance relating to the
procurement of adequate and appropriate health insurance coverage to individuals who are eligible to
receive [Medicare] benefits”); id. § 1395b-6 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission costs); id.
§ 1395b-8 (chronic care improvement organizations, which include “disease management organization[s], health insurer[s], integrated delivery system[s], physician group practice[s], a consortium of
such entities, or any other legal entity that the Secretary determines appropriate”); id. § 1395m(x)
(rural emergency hospitals); id. § 1395w-27a(h) (essential hospitals); id. § 1395mm(i) (health maintenance organizations); id. § 1395ddd (program integrity).
53
OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 83 (“[Medicare’s] popularity can be attributed, in part, to its
financial design. The Medicare payroll tax has created the sense of public entitlement that its architects anticipated.”).
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Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund.” 54 Thus, the SMI trust fund would be insulated from the direct impacts of insolvency. 55
The trust fund financing structure means that HHS and Congress must ensure that expenditures on hospital and related costs do not exceed revenues
through the Medicare payroll tax and other sources. They have repeatedly
failed to do so. In its history, Medicare has not controlled the solvency of the
program between solvency “crises,” repeatedly depleting the Trust Fund until
it was within six years of insolvency. 56 Each time, only major bipartisan legislation restructuring health policy in the United States resolved the resulting
Medicare insolvency “crisis.” 57 This included the Social Security Amendments
of 1983, eliminating “reasonable cost” reimbursement for hospitals and creating the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS); 58 the 1997 Balanced
Budget Act that included large cuts to Medicaid—a program that covers eligible low income individuals 59—and set the stage for the rise of Medicare coverage offered through private insurance companies, known as “Medicare Advantage” or “Medicare Part C;”60 and the ACA, supplemented by the Medicare
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), which created “Accountable Care Organizations” and a system of advanced payment models. 61

JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., A PRIMER ON MEDICARE: KEY
FACTS ABOUT THE MEDICARE PROGRAM AND THE PEOPLE IT COVERS 32–34 (2015), https://files.kff.
org/attachment/report-a-primer-on-medicare-key-facts-about-the-medicare-program-and-the-peopleit-covers [https://perma.cc/2DPG-NYJZ].
55
See id. at 32 (“Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund, is financed
through a combination of general revenues, premiums paid by beneficiaries, and interest and other
sources.”).
56
OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 75 (describing a “pattern of crisis and reform that has driven
Medicare politics since the program’s enactment”); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57
Oberlander, supra note 48, at 1120–22 (describing “the practice . . . of adopting Medicare reform as a part of large-scale fiscal legislation”); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
58
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601–607, 97 Stat. 65, 149–172.
59
The law came at a time when “the notion that Medicare was a program in crisis [was] a staple
of American politics.” OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 74. In exchange for changes that increased costs
in the program, fiscal conservatives insisted on broad reforms to “control” spending in other health
and welfare programs, including a $61 billion reduction in spending through the Medicaid program,
which covers eligible low-income individuals. Andy Schneider, Overview of Medicaid Provisions in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, P.L. 105-33, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.
cbpp.org/sites/default/files/archive/908mcaid.htm [https://perma.cc/72ZR-K7U8] (Sept. 8, 1997). The
amendments also expanded states’ ability to privatize their Medicaid programs. See Nicole Huberfeld,
Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 448 (2011) (“The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
allowed states to simply amend their State Plans to implement managed care rather than requiring
them to seek waivers.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a) (2005))).
60
See CUBANSKI ET AL., supra note 54, at 32 (describing private Medicare coverage through
“Medicare Advantage” plans).
61
Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment
Model (APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Physician-Focused Pay54
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This cycle of near-insolvency and repair has been harmful to Medicare, to
the project of health reform overall, and to the country. Each successive insolvency crisis damages the legitimacy of Medicare, creating a (perhaps accurate)
picture of a lack of fiscal control that has undermined political support for expanding public health insurance in the United States. 62 More practically, waiting until the programmatic “last minute” to develop and implement reforms to
protect the solvency of Medicare dramatically limits the menu of reforms
available to those with immediate, direct payoff. 63 Some such reforms include
savings from cuts in benefits, increases in beneficiary obligations, tax increases, and cuts in other programs. 64 This excludes many of the most meaningful,
substantive means of reducing health care costs, such as by incentivizing the
development of less expensive alternatives to current technologies or encouraging preventive care and care coordination. 65 Indeed, every year in their report on the program’s solvency, Medicare’s Trustees suggest reforms that
would both improve the program and reduce cost. 66 As the insolvency date
draws nearer, however, they are forced to warn that the later solvency is tackled, the fewer such reforms will be possible. 67
Relatedly, the cycle of insolvency has skewed health policy by ensuring
that, when Congress legislates on health reform, it is within a narrative of
“solv[ing]” the “cost problem” in health care, 68 or the “spending problem” in
ment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162 (May 9, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414, 495) (outlining
advanced payment models).
62
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that Medicare’s continuous financial crises
undermine support for expanding the program).
63
Hyman, supra note 20, at 1188, 1197 (“The consistent approach when attempting ‘reform’ is to
fix the short term and ignore the (far more problematic) long term.” (citing Robert M. Ball, The Sky
Isn’t Falling on Medicare, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2001), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm2001-jul-24-me-25899-story.html [https://perma.cc/97ES-GDZZ ])).
64
See generally Van de Water, supra note 10 (outlining potential reforms to Medicare).
65
See, e.g., William M. Sage, Explaining America’s Spendthrift Healthcare System: The Enduring Effects of Public Regulation on Private Competition, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF HEALTHCARE
FINANCING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF MODELS AND OUTCOMES 17, 34–36 (Wolf Sauter,
Jos Boertjens, Johan van Manen & Misja Mikkers eds., 2019) (describing how “accreted health law”
contributes to inefficiency and waste in health care systems); Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche,
Health Care Costs and the Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955, 961 (2019) (problematizing the
lack of incentives to innovate cost-effective treatments and preventive measures).
66
See, e.g., THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS,
2020 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 9 (2020), https://www.cms.gov/
files/document/2020-medicare-trustees-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FYV-BDR8].
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Press Release, Richard S. Schweiker, Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., Statement on
Proposed Changes in the Social Security System (May 12, 1981), reprinted in Special, Schweiker’s
Pensions Statement, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1981, at A29 (introducing proposed reforms by explaining
they would “keep the system from going broke”).
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government. 69 Scholars such as Professor Taleed El-Sabawi have documented
how the way Congress defines a regulatory problem shapes the solutions it
evaluates and implements. 70 This pattern has proven true when it comes to legislation responding to Medicare solvency crises. 71 Recent legislative debates
about Medicare’s solvency frame the problem as inherent in government-run
health care, motivating major legislative steps toward the privatization of the
program to be run through a for-profit health insurance model. 72
What explains this cycle of insolvency? Of course, any given Medicare
insolvency is in a superficial sense “caused” by an arithmetical imbalance—
either too much spending or too little revenue. Thus, demographic shifts and
cost growth are appropriately blamed for particular insolvency crises, leading
legal scholarship rightly (albeit almost exclusively) to focus on specific, substantive policy reforms to reduce spending. 73 These recommendations include
giving patients greater “skin in the game” of their health care through cost
sharing, 74 incentivizing individual providers to take costs into account at the
bedside through fiduciary duties 75 properly incentivizing hospital systems,76 or
allowing the Medicare program to ration treatments and services (but not patient care) based on their cost effectiveness. 77
69
See, e.g., Oberlander, supra note 48, at 1118 (explaining how political leadership developing
the 1997 Balanced Budget Act leveraged the Medicare fiscal crisis to motivate sweeping cuts in
spending programs; “the concern was not just that the Medicare trust fund would soon go bankrupt,
but also that Medicare would soon bankrupt the government”).
70
See Taleed El-Sabawi, What Motivates Legislators to Act: Problem Definition & the Opioid
Epidemic, a Case Study, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 189, 190–91 (2018) (explaining how the way a
problem is defined influences perceptions of possible solutions).
71
See Oberlander, supra note 48, at 1117 (describing how members of Congress who had long
sought to reduce entitlement spending seized on “[t]he trust fund shortfall . . . [as] a convenient problem to which [they] could attach the solution that they already had in mind”).
72
See infra notes 317–319 and accompanying text (describing a consistent pressure for Medicare
privatization).
73
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 20 (outlining Medicare cost cutting reforms); Buck, supra note 20
(same); Fox, supra note 20 (same); Brian Elbel & Mark Schlesinger, Responsive Consumerism: Empowerment in Markets for Health Plans, 87 MILBANK Q. 633, 634 (2009) (advocating for Medicare
improvement through “consumer empowerment”).
74
See Elbel & Schlesinger, supra note 73, at 634 (“State and federal governments continue to
adopt new policies designed to enhance this aspect of consumer empowerment, by creating . . . incentives for consumers to make cost-effective choices.” (citation omitted) (first citing David G. Stevenson, Is a Public Reporting Approach Appropriate for Nursing Home Care?, 31 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’Y & L. 773 (2006); and then citing Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Rise in Health Care Spending and
What to Do About It, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 1436 (2005))).
75
See Buck, supra note 20, at 1093–94 (“This Article seeks to expand the fiduciary relationship
and recognize a new duty of loyalty that providers would owe to Medicare payers.”).
76
See Bagley, supra note 20, at 577 (“[T]he success of any particular reform will depend fundamentally on . . . align[ing] the practice patterns of Medicare’s physicians . . . with federal priorities.”).
77
See Fox, supra note 20, at 5 (“Medicare needs to be changed, giving CMS the power and obligation to openly consider the cost of new medical treatments before covering them.”).
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Conceptualizing Medicare insolvency as an arithmetical byproduct of
demographics and the particular policies in place at any given moment fails to
explain the program’s cycle of insolvency, however. 78 Why do “fixes” never
seem to last? Why do the program’s policies, as they develop, creep inexorably
toward greater spending? Several scholars have pointed to a possible explanation: an alignment of powerful interests who use their influence in the legislative and regulatory processes to steer the program to increase, not decrease,
costs. 79 In a phrase, the problem is the program’s political economy, in the
sense of that term as it is used in the field of law and political economy. 80
Whatever their individual incentives in a particular case, the concentrated,
powerful interests who influence the program’s development—hospitals and
other providers, health insurers, beneficiaries, and pharmaceutical companies—are incentivized to make Medicare more “generous,” not less. 81 So their
Cf. SKOCPOL, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that “[m]oralists and “technocrats” often develop
analyses that “lack . . . historical and political sensibility”).
79
See OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 76 (“Medicare financing is the single most important pattern in program politics . . . more than any other factor, [it has] driven the direction and timing of
program reform.”); Clark. C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American
Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 10 (“[I]ndustry and other interests . . .
manipulate people’s thinking . . . both as consumers and as voters.”); David A. Hyman, Getting the
Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 265, 279 [hereinafter Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out
Behind] (“[P]rovider capture of state and federal legislators . . . is the rule . . . .”); Hyman, supra note
20, at 1181 (describing the role of lobbying by device manufacturers in preventing cost cutting); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Medicare Advisory Board, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., &
ETHICS 21, 21 (2011) [hereinafter Jost, The Independent Medicare Advisory Board] (stating that HHS
and Congress “are . . . driven by special interest politics . . . . Both Medicare payment formulas and
coverage determinations often seem to be driven by political, rather than scientific or economic, considerations.” (footnote omitted) (citing Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 39 (1999) [hereinafter Jost, Governing Medicare])); Charles Silver & David A. Hyman, There Is
a Better Way: Make Medicaid and Medicare More Like Social Security, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
149, 151–52 (2020) (discussing political opposition to Medicare reforms).
80
See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 23, at 1792 (in contrast to “political economy” in “mainstream economics departments,” “law and political economy” is used in a historical, radical sense that
explores “the relation of politics to the economy, understanding that the economy is always already
political in both its origins and its consequences” (citing Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Power and
Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 324, 324 (1992)).
81
See generally, e.g., Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind, supra note 79 (describing
comparisons between Medicare providers’ reimbursement rates, resulting in continuous advocacy for
more generous Medicare reimbursement). Providers’ stake in Medicare costs is not limited to their
interest in Medicare reimbursement. Private insurance agreements often base provider payment
amounts on a multiple of Medicare payment rates, meaning that any increase in Medicare rates means
increased reimbursement for many providers even for patients who have private health insurance, not
Medicare. See, e.g., Medicare Rates as a Benchmark: Too Much, Too Little or Just Right?, ALTARUM
HEALTHCARE VALUE HUB (Feb. 2020), https://www.healthcarevaluehub.org/advocate-resources/
publications/medicare-rates-benchmark-too-much-too-little-or-just-right [https://perma.cc/R4BL7PWV] (describing the “common approach” to “benchmark [private payment rates] against the rates
. . . for Medicare beneficiaries”).
78
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lobbying dollars and political influence are directed at shifting the program
toward greater spending. This is true when it comes to the frequent under-theradar legislative tweaks to the program that mark the periods between solvency
crises. 82 It is also true when it comes to HHS’s myriad decisions implementing
and adjusting the program. 83
To be sure, advocates of greater spending do not have complete control,
and suffer both wins and losses in their lobbying efforts. Taxpayer groups and
those concerned about effects on other federal priorities—not to mention the
public interest—have a general interest in combatting efforts to expand wasteful spending through the program. 84 But that counteracting influence is strongest in the midst of solvency crises, not in maintaining the program’s finances
when insolvency is many years away. 85
The nature of judicial review compounds this bias in the political economy of Medicare against controlling costs long term. Courts are not involved
when HHS arguably spends “too much” on Medicare or allows funds to flow
that should not. Although the beneficiaries of other spending programs, younger generations, and taxpayers are injured when Medicare overspends the Trust
Fund, 86 the Supreme Court has held that generalized pecuniary interests are
insufficient to confer standing. 87 Meanwhile, any effort HHS makes to reduce
Cooper et al., supra note 24, at 10 (citing Christopher Lee, Medicare Bill Partly a Special Interest Care Package, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2003/11/23/medicare-bill-partly-a-special-interest-care-package/d884aebf-005c-4363-a56d-6d7777
e0cf28/ [https://perma.cc/68ZC-M89U]) (describing provisions added at the behest of home-state
senators)).
83
See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 160 (3d ed. 2016) (describing the role of health care industry lobbyists in the development of regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act, and their focus
on costs); Hyman, supra note 20, at 1181, 1183 n.60 (describing lobbying efforts by providers and
manufacturers); see also Silver & Hyman, supra note 79, at 151–52 (noting that, as opposed to lobbying for Medicare reform, which would lengthen the Trust Fund’s lifetime, providers are more interested in receiving greater reimbursements, which necessarily depletes the Trust Fund).
84
Jost, Governing Medicare, supra note 79, at 78–80 (arguing providers’ influence is “counterbalanced” in Medicare by fiscal constraints and occasional conflict of interest between providers and
beneficiaries or among providers).
85
See OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 147–48 (noting that major Medicare policy choices have
been driven by solvency crises, when fiscal concerns dominate, but cumulatively-important minor
choices have been driven by interest groups).
86
Over-spending Medicare receipts harms either taxpayers (if the increased costs are made up by
increased taxes), future generations (if the increased costs are paid by deficit spending or reducing
Medicare’s generosity in the future), or recipients of other spending programs (if such programs are
cut to fund increases in Medicare spending). Cf. William M. Sage & Timothy M. Westmoreland,
Following the Money: The ACA’s Fiscal-Political Economy and Lessons for Future Health Care
Reform, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 434, 441 (2020) (explaining how “[t]he tyranny of the federal budget” can make spending a zero-sum choice about increasing generosity of some programs by reducing
generosity of others).
87
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (describing limitations on taxpayer standing).
82
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spending is certain to be met with legal challenge by whoever loses out,
whether hospital, 88 insurer, 89 dialysis provider, 90 nursing home, 91 or beneficiary. 92 And courts often take a sympathetic view of such plaintiffs—the nature
of judicial review means that the slighted party is before the court, telling their
story, and expressing their need. 93 Thus, the federal courts have acted as a oneway ratchet in the arc of Medicare policy, rejecting HHS administrative efforts
to control costs in dozens of cases involving billions of dollars, 94 but never
once invalidating an HHS decision as spending too much.
In light of these forces, it is not surprising that Medicare is again facing a
fiscal crisis in the short term, with insolvency predicted either just before or
just after the next presidential election. 95 Should we expect Congress to step in
with major health reform legislation to address Medicare’s solvency, as it has
in the past? In economic speak, is Medicare in an uncomfortable but reliable
equilibrium of crisis, fix, crisis, or might it eventually divert from its current
pattern into a new one: crisis, insolvency, fix? 96 Or, might Medicare become
insolvent and stay that way—crisis, insolvency, insolvency? 97

See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Hargan, 289 F. Supp. 3d 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2017) (challenging a
rule reducing pharmaceutical reimbursement rates for hospitals), aff’d sub nom. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Azar, 895 F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
89
See, e.g., Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1213–14 (9th
Cir. 2013) (challenging the decision to terminate a contract with an insurance company and require
repayment of prospective payments to the insurance company).
90
See, e.g., Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 518 F. Supp. 2d 197, 198 (D.D.C. 2007) (challenging
the denial of reimbursement for certain “bad debts” of a dialysis clinic).
91
See, e.g., Blossom S., L.L.C. v. Sebelius, 987 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging HHS’s termination of a nursing home’s provider agreement).
92
See, e.g., Kort v. Burwell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2016) (challenging Medicare beneficiaries’ denial by HHS of coverage for certain cognitive treatments).
93
See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1152–
68 (2012) (reviewing literature on judicial bias in civil cases).
94
See, e.g., Cape Cod Hosp. v. Sebelius, 630 F.3d 203, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (ruling for hospitals
in a high-stakes reimbursement case); Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 807, 815 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (same); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 410 F. Supp. 3d 142, 156 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting a
site-neutral payment policy in Medicare Part B), rev’d, 964 F.3d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied
sub nom. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 2853 (2021); Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 139 F. Supp. 3d 240, 265 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking down the Secretary’s “0.2 percent reduction”
in Medicare reimbursements).
95
See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text (describing various Medicare insolvency estimates).
96
This was the path Medicaid’s Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) followed in 2018.
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 37–38 (noting that there have been consistent funding extensions in past
years, but that, in the most recent case, there was a lapse in funding for the program until long-term
funding and contested issues were solved).
97
This was the path the ACA’s cost sharing reduction subsidies followed after their disappropriation. Id. at 32–33.
88
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Although Congress has intervened to address Medicare’s solvency in each
past crisis, four overlapping trends indicate that the present situation is different, such that Medicare may well be forced to confront insolvency in the near
future. First, insolvency is imminent at this writing. As the Trustees have lamented for years, the closer the program is to insolvency, the more dramatic—
and potentially draconian—are the changes necessary to avoid it. 98 Health policy observers thus predict that this time around, fixing Medicare will be an
even heavier lift than in prior crises, requiring either cuts in benefits or eligibility, or increases in revenue. 99 This influences political calculations, with any
legislative effort to preserve the program’s solvency potentially being cast as
either gutting the program (if it cuts costs), raising taxes (if it increases revenue), or robbing Peter to pay Paul (if it diverts funds from other programs). 100
Second, in health law, “Congress has repeatedly failed to [enact legislation] necessary for the government” to respect and fulfill entitlements, sometimes temporarily and sometimes indefinitely; impacted programs have included the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, the Indian Health Service, and the ACA’s individual market
cost-sharing reduction subsidies. 101 This has forced administrators to make
previously “unthinkable” choices about how to manage a disappropriated program, and has given rise to several billion-dollar lawsuits by disappointed
claimants seeking judicial relief. 102
Third, in fiscal law, Congress has repeatedly failed to rise to the challenge
of budgetary pressures and address fiscal issues through regular order. 103 The
recurrence of “game-of-chicken” negotiations in the “new fiscal politics” make

See, e.g., THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS,
supra note 66, at 41 (“The sooner solutions are enacted, the more flexible and gradual they can be.”).
99
See generally Van de Water, supra note 10 (discussing options to bolster the Trust Fund).
100
See Medicare for All: Higher Taxes, Fewer Choices, Longer Lines, SENATE REPUBLICAN
POL’Y COMM. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/medicare-for-all-higher-taxesfewer-choices-longer-lines [https://perma.cc/B5G4-KKNG] (“Proponents say ‘free’ health care for all
would eliminate premiums, copays, and deductibles for everything from major surgery to dental, vision, hearing, and mental health services. In reality, enormous tax increases for all would simply prepay whatever health care services the government chooses to provide.”). Cf. Dena Bunis, Older Americans Oppose Social Security, Medicare Cuts to Fix Federal Debt, AARP (May 26, 2021), https://
www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2021/survey-social-security-medicare-cuts.html [https://
perma.cc/N7CU-YAD9] (outlining AARP’s opposition to passing legislation that would cut Medicare
benefits to fix federal debt despite the elderly’s interest in reducing federal debt).
101
See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 4, 27, 30, 34, 37, 41 n.182 (describing disappropriation and
the programs impacted by it).
102
See id. at 5 (noting the many “blockbuster” lawsuits resulting from disappropriation).
103
See David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 183, 185 (2015) (noting the “failure [of most legislative bodies] to regularly pass” fiscal initiatives and defining “new fiscal politics”).
98
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bargaining failures almost inevitable. 104 And, as illustrated by the return of the
debt ceiling impasse at the time of this writing, the new fiscal politics often
sees Congress adopt a series of short-term patches that ultimately end in failure, rather than a long-term fix. 105 In Medicare, this could easily take the form of
a one-time measure pushing insolvency by a year or two along with a supercommittee or other mechanism whose failure would set up eventual insolvency.
Fourth, in politics, an era of “hardball” sees the party opposing the president constantly looking to exert their influence in Congress to frustrate governance. A vigorous scholarly debate continues about whether one political
party is more to blame for this era of “constitutional hardball.” 106 Regardless,
prudence counsels that Medicare might well be the next battleground. The possibility that legislation in the current Congress could expand the program increases this risk. Such legislation is predicted to follow a partisan path that
would create opportunities (even if unjustified) for the opposing party to blame
the program’s looming insolvency on that reform legislation rather than on
policy choices of the past. 107
Optimists might object that despite these overarching trends, Medicare is
too culturally sacred and politically salient for Congress to let the program implode. This view wrongly assumes that insolvency in Medicare would entail a
clear deadline and immediate consequences that would acutely threaten patients and, more importantly, force an “up or down” vote on preventive legislation. To the contrary, as the next Part explains, Medicare insolvency would not
immediately impact patients. Further, its impacts on providers and hospitals
would be highly variable (though quite significant for some), and those impacts could emerge slowly and not be finally determined for years. Experience
Id. at 185.
See Understanding the Sequester, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.crfb.org/blogs/understanding-sequester [https://perma.cc/6JCA-H98G] (discussing the
effects of sequestration in the years following the Supercommittee’s failure to agree on a budget relief
package).
106
See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 17, at 918 (attaching more blame for the current era of
“constitutional hardball” on Republicans than Democrats); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
107
Reported “reconciliation instructions” would enable Congress to expand the program without
facing a filibuster, but do not appear to leave room to replace or to fix the existing Trust Fund financing structure or address the program’s looming insolvency. See Jonathan Weisman, Emily Cochrane &
Jim Tankersley, Democrats Roll Out $3.5 Trillion Budget to Fulfill Biden’s Broad Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/us/politics/biden-social-spending-deal.html [https://perma.
cc/PF2Y-DNEF] (Aug. 23, 2021) (describing the instructions); Michael McAuliff, Sen. Wyden: $3.5T
Budget May Have to Trim but It Can Set a Path to ‘Ambitious Goals,’ KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July
20, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/senator-ron-wyden-interview-democrats-budget-ambitioushealth-policy-goals/ [https://perma.cc/6AUR-AY9P] (describing the reconciliation process in which
“Congress approves budget instructions for bills that affect spending, revenue or debt. . . . [T]hose
bills can then advance on an expedited basis and pass in the Senate with a simple majority, with no
threat of a filibuster.”).
104
105
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with the CHIP disappropriation, cost-sharing reduction disappropriation, and
“debt ceiling” teaches that as insolvency approaches, expressions of uncertainty about the actual deadline and the consequences of missing it will grow. 108
With that rising uncertainty, pressure to act may well wain, not rise. 109
All of this raises the questions: What would actually happen if Medicare
became insolvent? Are there any steps that could be taken now, by HHS, Congress, or courts, to avoid, or at least mitigate, insolvency? The remainder of
this Article takes up these questions.
II. ADMINISTERING INSOLVENCY
Prior scholarship has elaborated well the complicated public-private apparatus through which Medicare receives, processes, and pays billions of claims
every year. 110 It has also touched on the legal framework of statutes, regulations, and guidance that defines and supports that apparatus. 111 For present
purposes, it suffices to highlight that Medicare’s administrative apparatus and
the underlying statutes, regulations, and guidance assume solvency, yet say
nothing specific about what to do if the program becomes insolvent. 112
See, e.g., CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST., WHEN WILL CHIP
FUNDING RUN OUT? 1–2 (2017), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/20171220_
PressRelease_CHIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9B9-G9JY] (elaborating on the “CHIP patch” passed by
Congress); Timothy Jost, New Guidance on CSR Payments and Risk Adjustment: Answers . . . and
More Questions, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170811.061514/full/ [https://perma.cc/8PGW-QH8J] (“HHS may stop reimbursing insurers
for reducing cost sharing for low-income consumers at some undetermined point in the future—it has
not yet decided. . . . Because of the uncertainty HHS has created, some states have instructed their
insurers to assume the payments will not be made and increase their rates accordingly.”); Kate Davidson, Capitol Hill Lacks Clarity on Debt-Ceiling Date, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/
capitol-hill-lacks-clarity-on-debt-ceiling-date-1497193228 [https://perma.cc/W3EZ-7HLT] (June 11,
2017) (bemoaning “[m]ixed messages and a dearth of details” regarding the debt ceiling deadline and
effect, arguing that this “[l]ack of clarity complicates the administration’s efforts to convince lawmakers to raise the debt limit sooner rather than later”).
109
See discussion infra Section III.B.
110
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 20, at 522 (citing the lack of uniformity of interests between
private physicians and the government in administering Medicare); Jost, Governing Medicare, supra
note 79, at 79–80 (describing how the government, interest groups, and beneficiaries all “shape [Medicare] policy”); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Administrative Law of the Medicare Program, 15
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 111, 111 (2015) (noting the complexity of not only the “web of
legislative [and agency] rules,” but also the appeals process, which governs a “variety of issues” for
beneficiaries and providers alike).
111
See, e.g., Jost, Governing Medicare, supra note 79, at 79–80. See generally Bagley, supra note
20; Kinney, supra note 110.
112
See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, FAQs on Medicare Financing and Trust Fund Solvency, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/faqs-onmedicare-financing-and-trust-fund-solvency/ [https://perma.cc/V6JY-VSA3] (“[T]here is no automatic process in place or precedent to determine how to apportion the available funds or how to fill the
shortfall.”).
108
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If this occurs, the Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution would
forbid spending beyond the Trust Fund (and the Anti-Deficiency Act would
render it a felony with a five-year statute of limitations). 113 Thus, if and when
the statute’s assumption of Trust Fund solvency becomes false, administering
an insolvent Medicare program will force determination—by HHS, courts, and
perhaps Congress—of five open legal questions: (1) How will choices about
administering an insolvent program be made?; (2) should payment of claims be
delayed, or should all claims be paid on time but reduced pro rata?; (3) would
some claims or claimants be insulated from payment disruptions?; (4) would
shorted claimants be entitled to judicial relief?; and (5) would litigation to decide
that question proceed in the Court of Federal Claims or in federal district court?
This Part discusses each choice, its determinants, and its implications for
the likelihood and course of insolvency in Medicare. Section A addresses the
administrative law question of the process for deciding how to administer insolvency in Medicare. 114 Section B then addresses the substantive question
whether to delay or reduce payments. 115 Section C discusses the substantive
question of insulating high-priority claimants. 116 Section D addresses the five
trillion dollar remedies question of whether shorted providers could collect
from the Judgment Fund through litigation. 117 Section E addresses the procedural question of the path of such blockbuster litigation—whether through the
Court of Federal Claims or federal district court. 118
A. Process
An insolvent Medicare program will be unable to operate as required by
the Medicare statute. 119 Insolvency would force the agency to make substantive decisions discussed in the following sections, but also a first, primary decision about process: How should the agency make decisions about administration under conditions of insolvency? When should the agency make those
choices, who should be involved, and what form should they take?

113
See Lawrence, supra note 11, 83–84 (first citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1), 1350; and then
citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)) (describing how the Anti-Deficiency Act “prohibit[s] both executive expenditures and commitments in advance of appropriations” while proscribing criminal sanction for its
violation).
114
See infra notes 119–137 and accompanying text.
115
See infra notes 138–158 and accompanying text.
116
See infra notes 159–176 and accompanying text.
117
See infra notes 177–209 and accompanying text.
118
See infra notes 211–231 and accompanying text.
119
It is worth repeating that the outpatient coverage of Medicare Part B and pharmaceutical coverage of Medicare Part D are not funded through the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and so are insulated from the direct impacts of insolvency. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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In prior disappropriations, HHS decided for itself what to do, without
public consultation, announcing its approach in guidance documents. 120 One
could certainly imagine HHS taking this path now—avoiding explicit advance
consideration or public involvement in its decisions about how to manage insolvency until it was actually reached (itself a difficult date to pin down). It
then might simply announce its approach by fiat—or even just implement its
insolvency plan and allow the public to infer the substance.
Alternatively, HHS could, as a preemptive measure, opt to promulgate
regulations setting forth how it would administer an insolvent Medicare program well in advance, by notice and comment rulemaking. 121 HHS is required
by the Medicare statute annually to propose, seek comment on, and finalize
formal payment notices governing Medicare reimbursement for hospitals and
insurers. 122 These notices routinely include a range of administrative changes
and adjustments, big and small. Initial proposals ordinarily must be published
in spring during the year ahead of the year to which they apply in order to be
finalized by applicable deadlines. 123 The agency could simply include its
fallback insolvency plan in such a notice, along with a final deadline by which
Congress would have to act to avoid triggering the fallback.
Though technical, this choice of process could prove pivotal. It would alter by months or even years the time it would take for courts to resolve litigation by providers either challenging the agency’s approach to administering
insolvency or asking for an order for full payment. 124 The reason has to do
with Medicare’s jurisdictional “channeling”—or “exhaustion”—provisions that
mean that, “in most instances, judicial review is available only after the ex-

120
See Distribution of Fiscal Year 1994 Contract Support Funds, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,694, 68,694
(Dec. 28, 1993) (announcing, three months into fiscal year 1994, the agency’s approach for handling
shortfall in fiscal year 1994 appropriations); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. & CTR. FOR
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RISK CORRIDORS AND
BUDGET NEUTRALITY 1 (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-andFAQs/Downloads/faq-risk-corridors-04-11-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT7D-C6NK] (providing
guidance in the case of a risk corridor fund shortfall); CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., GEO. UNIV. HEALTH
POL’Y INST., supra note 108 (describing confusion about how CHIP shortfalls would be administered
in states).
121
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)–(b) (granting the agency authority to act by rulemaking, requiring
both notice and the opportunity for public comment regarding proposed rules).
122
Id. § 1395ww(d)(6) (describing Part A payment notice); id. § 1395w-23(b) (describing Part C
payment notice).
123
Id. § 1395ww(j)(5); id. § 1395w-23(b)(1)–(2) (requiring advance notice and comment on
changes in Medicare Advantage payment methodology “[a]t least 45 days” before a final rule to be
issued by “the first Monday in April before the calendar year concerned”).
124
The specifics of such litigation are discussed in Section II.D. See infra notes 177–209 and
accompanying text.
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haustion of lengthy administrative processes.” 125 The Medicare statute allows
expedited consideration of challenges to regulations through these processes,
so a regulation dictating the agency’s approach could be challenged directly in
federal court just weeks or months after its issuance. 126 By contrast, absent a
regulation, providers would have to wait until their individual payments were
actually impacted, then appeal those payments through a lengthy administrative process. 127 Additionally, the Medicare statute’s exhaustion provision
would preclude judicial review until that process ran its course. 128
Relatedly, proceeding by regulation would mean that Congress and all the
entities with interests in Medicare would know precisely how the program’s
insolvency would impact them before the program actually became insolvent.
This is because black letter administrative law (a principle known as the Accardi doctrine) binds the agency to follow its own regulations. 129 By contrast,
if the agency does not regulate in advance, then its approach would remain an
open question during congressional deliberations. This would increase the uncertainty in those deliberations about what would happen should Congress fail
to act and about the deadline for congressional action.
Although somewhat more abstract, it is also important to note that the
agency’s choice of process would implicate important administrative process
values including accountability, transparency, and participation. The United
States Supreme Court emphasized, in 2019, in Azar v. Allina Health Ser-

125
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTHCARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 34 (2003) (first citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h),
1395ii; and then citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984)); see Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (“‘[E]xhaustion’ . . . demands the ‘channeling’ of virtually all
legal attacks through the agency . . . .”).
126
See § 1395oo(f)(1) (providing for expedited judicial review when “the [Provider Reimbursement Review] Board determines . . . that it is without authority to decide the question”); 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1842(f)(1)(ii) (2021) (noting that expedited review is available if “the legal question is a challenge . . . to the substantive or procedural validity of a regulation or CMS Ruling” (emphasis added));
see, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 967 F.3d 818, 823, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing procedural
history where a challenge to a regulation issued November 13, 2017 was dismissed for failure to exhaust, but exhaustion was completed and a new suit over which the court had jurisdiction was
brought, which the district court resolved in the hospitals’ favor on December 27, 2018; the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit subsequently reversed), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Hosp.
Ass’n v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021).
127
Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (requiring the claimant to show a sufficient
nexus between taxpayer status and the nature of the unconstitutional action to secure judicial review).
128
JOST, supra note 125, at 34–35 (“Attempts to obtain judicial review when it is not available by
statute and precluded by 42 U.S.C. 405(h) have generally been rejected by the Supreme Court, despite
repeated attempts by the lower courts to find some jurisdictional toehold.”).
129
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954) (“In short, as long as
the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board
or dictate its decision in any manner.”).
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vices, 130 that the Medicare statute endorses these values through its mandated
rulemaking for changes in payment standards, whether made in “substantive
. . . [or] interpretive rules.” 131 A process such as advance rulemaking, with notice and comment, would promote these values and align with the Medicare
statute’s endorsement. 132 Meanwhile, even if lawful by virtue of an emergency,
last-minute decision-making by agency fiat would risk increasing controversy
and confusion. 133
Even though administrative law favors advance rulemaking, the process
decision would largely be within the discretion of HHS under current law. The
Medicare statute’s preference for rulemaking notwithstanding, 134 an agency
failure to address insolvency in advance through regulation would leave no
option but to do so later, without such formality, to comply with the Appropriations Clause. 135 And there is little possibility of courts forcing the agency to
promulgate Medicare bankruptcy rules in advance. The administrative law doctrines governing whether courts will compel an agency to engage in rulemaking are weak and rarely applicable. 136 Additionally, the lack of an explicit
statutory command that the agency make policy, let alone a deadline for one,
would prove fatal under those doctrines. 137
B. Delay or Pro Rata Reduction?
Whatever process it uses, the most fundamental substantive question facing HHS will be how to deal with its inability to make timely payment on all
Medicare claims. Specifically, would the agency accommodate insolvency
139 S. Ct. 1804, 1808–09 (2019) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh).
Id. at 1809, 1811 (“Congress didn’t just adopt the APA’s notice-and-comment regime for the
Medicare program. . . . Instead, Congress chose to write a new, Medicare-specific statute.”). See generally Graham Haviland, Not So Different After All: The Status of Interpretive Rules in the Medicare
Act, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511 (2018) (discussing judicial interpretations of the Medicare statute’s “notice and comment [requirement] for proposed regulations”).
132
Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. at 1816 (“Notice and comment gives affected parties fair
warning of potential changes in the law and an opportunity to be heard on those changes . . . .”).
133
Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1839–40 (2015) (surveying possible democratic legitimacy
impacts of emergency policymaking, whether legislative or administrative).
134
§ 1395hh (requiring notice and comment rulemaking for “substantive” rules).
135
See Hyman, supra note 20, at 1182 (“The sooner this problem is addressed, the less severe the
resulting dislocations will be.”).
136
See Sidney A. Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE
L.J. 1805, 1818 (2019) (“[A]s a general proposition, this court will compel an agency to institute
rulemaking proceedings only in extremely rare circumstances.” (quoting Ark. Power & Light Co. v.
ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
137
See id. at 1820–21 (noting that “an agency has an obligation . . . to respond to a rulemaking
petition” but that “courts are split” on how much weight to give Congress’s promulgation of a response deadline (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)).
130
131
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with a delay in processing full payments (the “delay” option) or, alternatively,
by paying all claims on time but reduced pro rata in light of the shortfall (the
“pro rata reduction” option)? Note, importantly, that each option assumes that
Medicare beneficiaries would continue to incur claims by seeing providers,
going to hospitals, and so on. This is because access to care from providers is
structured as an entitlement for beneficiaries, so there does not appear to be
any legal path by which beneficiaries’ eligibility for care could be circumscribed directly. 138 Rather, direct impacts would be on providers’ and insurers’
claims for reimbursement for having served Medicare beneficiaries.
The agency employed the “delay” option in administering the ACA’s risk
corridors disappropriation. 139 It committed to paying all claims in full eventually but, with insufficient funds, noted that it would need to delay payment until funds came in, resulting in an increasingly long backlog. 140 In the case of
Medicare, that would mean payment delays on all claims payable from the
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. This includes hospital inpatient claims, skilled
nursing facility claims, and the inpatient component of Medicare Part C plan
payments, among others. 141
The duration of delays in payment would begin small and gradually grow
longer and longer unless and until Congress acted. Specific delays would depend on real-time solvency projections and the logistics of different payment
pathways. 142 Generally, based on CBO projections, the required delays before
payment would be roughly two months in the first year of insolvency, four

See JOST, supra note 125, at 31 (“The language of entitlement is deeply embedded in the Medicare . . . statute[]. . . . [The phrase] ‘persons entitled to benefits’ . . . appears [in the Medicare statute
as a reference to beneficiaries] over 100 times . . . .”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare: What Are the
Real Problems? What Contribution Can Law Make to Real Solutions?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 45, 49–50 (2007) (“Medicare is an entitlement under federal law . . . .” (footnote omitted)
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 426-1(a), 1395c)); see also § 426(a) (“Every individual who [is eligible]
shall be entitled to hospital insurance benefits under part A . . . .”).
139
See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 32 (“HHS did not pay insurers the $12.3 billion called for by
the statutory formula over the three-year run of the program, even while recording the unpaid amounts
in ‘obligations’ in its financial reports.” (first citing Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d
1311, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options v.
United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020); then citing Molina Healthcare of Cal., Inc. v. United States,
133 Fed. Cl. 14, 25 (2017); and then citing Leslie Small, Government’s Unpaid Risk Corridor Tab
Swells to $12.3B, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/aca/
government-s-unpaid-risk-corridor-tab-swells-to-12-3b [https://perma.cc/2XWE-UB28])).
140
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. & CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT,
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 120.
141
See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (listing statutory provisions providing for the
types of payments that are withdrawn from the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund).
142
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining the variables that make pinning down
an exact insolvency date difficult).
138
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months in the second, and would eventually approach a year. 143 Finally, the
delay would stretch into multiple years as backlogs stacked up and the Trust
Fund’s shortfall increased. 144
Alternatively, in the tribal support cost disappropriation, the agency employed the pro rata reduction approach, paying all claims as usual but reducing
them by a rate necessary to maintain overall solvency. 145 It is not hard to imagine how this would operate in Medicare, because payment rate adjustments for
various purposes are common. 146 The agency would simply estimate, conservatively, the necessary adjustment for a given year and reduce payment rates
by a corresponding percentage. 147 The amount of the needed downward adjustment in provider and insurer payment rates would be roughly equal to the
amount of Medicare’s anticipated shortfall. The result is an approximately 17%
reduction in the first full year of insolvency, 18% in the second, and so on depending on the extent of the Trust Fund’s anticipated shortfall each year. 148
The choice between the delayed payment approach and a pro rata reduction would significantly impact the character of Medicare bankruptcy. Payment
delays would come on gradually, without any clear “cliff.” Moreover, such
delays would not immediately affect hospitals’ or insurers’ anticipated revenues—just the timing of their reimbursement. By contrast, a pro rata reduction
would be implemented a year at a time in that year’s payment rates. 149 This
would create a clear annual deadline by which Congress would be required to act
to avoid direct impacts on hospitals’ and insurers’ balance sheets. The presence

143
The CBO has not estimated delay length, but it has predicted a 17% shortfall in the first year
rising to a 19% shortfall by 2030. The Outlook for Major Federal Trust Funds: 2020 to 2030, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Sept. 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56541#:~:text=According%20to%20the
%20Congressional%20Budget,billion%20in%20fiscal%20year%202020.&text=Spending%20from
%20the%20trust%20funds,2030%20(see%20Table%202) [https://perma.cc/453J-2MN5]. The estimate above reflects the author’s simple arithmetic calculation converting this percentage of payments
due in a year into weeks of delay in a year.
144
See infra note 242 and accompanying text (estimating the likely length of reimbursement
delays based on CBO shortfall projections).
145
See Distribution of Fiscal Year 1994 Contract Support Funds, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,694, 68,694
(Dec. 28, 1993) (noting that “all tribes will be treated the same [in the event of] a shortfall”); see also
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 28.
146
See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing
agency adjustment authority).
147
If there were a surplus at year’s end, the agency could roll it into the next year’s adjustment.
148
This estimate is based on CBO projections. See generally The Outlook for Major Federal
Trust Funds: 2020 to 2030, supra note 143.
149
See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. & CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 120 (explaining how Trust Fund shortfalls, and therefore pro rata reductions, are evaluated on an annual basis).
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or absence of such a clear deadline may prove determinative of whether Congress takes action to avert insolvency or not, as discussed in Section III.B. 150
Just as significant, however, may be the implication of both the choice between delayed payment and a pro rata reduction for the timing of litigation, as
well as courts’ involvement in Medicare bankruptcy. Like the choice of process, this choice would have a significant impact on when and how litigation
could proceed. The delayed payment option would mean a long wait before
litigation. This is not only due to applicable exhaustion requirements, 151 but
also to limitations on judicial relief forcing unlawfully withheld agency action, 152 as well as the ripeness doctrine. 153 By contrast, a pro rata reduction
would avoid these threshold barriers. 154 This would shorten by months, and
more likely years, the time it would take for claimants to access federal court,
and so obtain any relief available there. 155
See discussion infra Section III.B (explaining how clarification of Medicare insolvency procedures would predictably decrease the likelihood that insolvency will occur in the first place, by facilitating preventive compromise in Congress).
151
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (precluding ordinary federal question jurisdiction over claims “arising
under” statute); id. § 1395ii (applying § 405(h) to Medicare claims); Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (“[Section] 405(h) prevents application of the ‘ripeness’ and ‘exhaustion’ exceptions . . . it demands the ‘channeling’ of virtually all legal attacks through the agency
. . . .”); UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Price, 248 F. Supp. 3d 192, 201–02 (D.D.C. 2017) (addressing
the explicability of the exhaustion requirement to Medicare Advantage).
152
See Shapiro, supra note 136, at 1818 (describing limited doctrines in which plaintiffs could
hope to force unlawfully withheld agency action).
153
Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (describing the ripeness doctrine,
where courts exercise discretion to decline injunctive and declaratory remedies depending on “fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration”
(footnote omitted)), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
154
Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 959 F.3d 1113, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that
provisions allow hospitals to “seek review of [reimbursement] rates before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board” (citing § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(ii))). As an agency action, a pro rata reduction would
not require litigation to compel. As for ripeness objections, a pro rata reduction would avoid these
both by: (1) providing a concrete policy for courts to review; and (2) by guaranteeing a one-year
change in rates, thereby avoiding ripeness arguments that their injury would be contingent on congressional failure to enact a fix in time. See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 171 (1967)
(stating the hardship prong considers whether withholding judicial review will have an “immediate
and substantial impact” on the plaintiff); Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. v. United States, 691 F.3d
1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (commenting that “[a] claim is not ripe for judicial review [if] it is contingent upon future events that may or may not occur” (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985))).
155
See discussion infra Sections II.D, II.E (explaining how a pro rata approach would likely
shorten the timeframe for providers to access judicial relief). The comparison of two recent Medicare
litigations—one over a delay, the other over a payment reduction—is informative. Compare Am.
Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. 14-851, 2018 WL 5723141, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018) (seeking “mandamus to compel [HHS] to comply with . . . statutory” appeals deadlines), with Adirondack Med. Ctr. v.
Sebelius, 891 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (challenging a reduction in Medicare payments to
rural community hospitals by HHS), aff’d, 740 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2014). It took several years for the
courts to conclude they could even hear the delay case; the payment reduction case was heard almost
150
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The decision whether to implement a payment delay or reduce payments
pro rata is more than likely up to the agency, both legally and logistically. As
for the law, there is a strong argument that current law does not require the
agency to make one choice or the other in accommodating insolvency. 156 As
for logistics, Medicare’s payment processes are certainly capable of accommoimmediately and resolved shortly thereafter. Compare Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2018 WL5723141, at *1
(“This case is now before the Court for a third time, following a second remand from the D.C. Circuit. . . . [Plaintiffs] filed this suit in May 2014.”), with Adirondack Med. Ctr., 740 F.3d at 696 (noting
that plaintiff sought review by “the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, which disclaimed jurisdiction,” filed the original suit in federal district court in 2012, and exhausted their appeals by January
2014). Specifically, in American Hospital Ass’n v. Azar, which was before the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia in 2018, the American Hospital Association (AHA) sued HHS over delays in
the processing of Medicare payment appeals. 2018 WL5723141, at *1–2. A rising flood of appeals in
2011 saw Medicare begin to miss the statutory deadline to render a decision within ninety days of
appeal. See § 1395ff(d) (outlining the ninety day deadline and allowance for District Court review in
the event the deadline lapses); Average Processing Time by Fiscal Year, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.
gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/average-processing-time-by-fiscal-year/index.
html [https://perma.cc/WE6R-FK7S] (Feb. 8, 2021) (reporting a 121-day appeal processing time in
2011 that has risen exponentially to 1,430 days in 2020). Hospitals did not even attempt to bring an
unreasonable delay action until May of 2014. See Litigation: AHA, Hospitals Sue to Require HHS to
Meet Deadlines for Deciding Appeals, AM. HOSP. ASS’N, https://www.aha.org/legal/litigation-ahahospitals-sue-require-hhs-meet-deadlines-deciding-appeals [https://perma.cc/7G8Z-3LSJ] (providing
court documents related to AHA litigation seeking to require HHS to observe appeals decision deadlines). The D.C. Circuit and District of Columbia District Court did not agree that such an action was
proper until November 2018, at which time the delay in processing appeals had stretched to over three
years. Average Processing Time by Fiscal Year, supra (noting that average appeals processing time in
2020 was almost four years). By contrast, in Adirondack Med. Ctr., which the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia decided in 2012, the agency promulgated a prospective reduction in payment
rates for fiscal year 2012 (beginning October 1, 2011) in August of 2011. 891 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42;
see Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and
the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System Changes and FY2011 Rates; Provider
Agreements and Supplier Approvals; and Hospital Conditions of Participation for Rehabilitation and
Respiratory Care Services; Medicaid Program: Accreditation for Providers of Inpatient Psychiatric
Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 50,042, 50,067–71 (Aug. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413,
415, 424, 440, 441, 482, 485, 489) (outlining the coming reduction in payments); Medicare Program;
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care
Hospital Prospective Payment System and FY2012 Rates; Hospitals’ FTE Resident Caps for Graduate
Medical Education Payment, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,476, 51,498–99 (Aug. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 476) (same). Plaintiffs immediately sought and obtained an “expedited judicial
review” determination from the Provider Reimbursement Review Board and filed suit on October 15,
2012. Adirondack Med. Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 2d at 42. The Court ruled on the statutory interpretation
question on which the case depended on September 17, 2012. Id. at 36, 48.
156
The statute both mandates payments to claimants and requires compliance within a specific
timeframe. Compare § 1395g(a) (“[T]he provider of services shall be paid . . . the amounts due such
provider under this part . . . .”), with id. § 1395h(c)(2)(A)–(c)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (“[Ninety-five] percent of
all claims submitted . . . [must be paid within thirty] days after the date on which the claim is received.”). Thus, insolvency would leave the Secretary no choice but to break one of these commands
(or violate the Appropriations Clause and Anti-Deficiency Act by spending despite the shortfall in
appropriations). See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing the Appropriations Clause and
Anti-Deficiency Act complications regarding Medicare insolvency).
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dating a pro rata reduction, and more than likely could accommodate payment
delays. 157 This latter option may pose administrative difficulties, especially to
honor the statute’s mandate of “equivalence” in the treatment of Medicare Part
A and Part C. 158
C. Triage?
It is easy enough for an academic to refer to a seventeen percent reduction
in Medicare payment rates, or to long delays in payments. Yet, for struggling
healthcare providers in a harsh environment—especially an asset-poor provider or one particularly reliant on Medicare dollars—the reality of disrupted
Medicare payments would be challenging, to say the least. Section III.A focuses on the market concentration, provider insolvencies, increased costs, and reduced access for patients that this disruption would eventually cause, as well as
the skewed distribution of such harms. 159
The fact that even uniform reductions or delays in Medicare payment
would impact various providers differently, posing a much greater challenge
for some, raises an additional, substantive question that HHS would have to
address, regardless of which approach it pursued. In the Social Security context, Professor John Harrison suggests that the costs of insolvency should be
targeted toward wealthier beneficiaries. 160 This question is one of prioritization, namely, whether the agency could (as a matter of law) and would (as a
matter of policy) differentiate among claimants seeking payment, insulating
some from insolvency’s effects. In medical parlance, could the agency “triage”
among claimants, prioritizing those for whom increasingly scarce dollars
would be most valuable, or would it be forced to employ a one-size-fits-all approach? 161 For example, could Medicare prioritize payments for hospitals that
Different claimants seek reimbursement through different processes, which themselves have
different timeframes. As a result, if the agency chose the delayed payment route, it would have to take
steps to operationalize it in a way that created equivalent delays across payment programs reimbursable through the hospital insurance trust fund to avoid differential treatment favoring some programs
over others, as well as a significant administrative burden. Cf. Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., 959
F.3d at 1120 (discussing the “significant administrative burden” avoided with a prospective, acrossthe-board remedy to an improper reduction of reimbursement rates).
158
Payment changes that systematically favored Part C (or Part A) would raise legal issues under the
actuarial equivalence provision of the Medicare statute. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (explaining the issues posed by the actuarial equivalence requirement and providing statutory support).
159
See discussion infra Section III.A (examining the potential harms of Medicare insolvency and
how advanced rulemaking could mitigate them).
160
Harrison, supra note 19, at 407 (“Congress today could provide that, in the case of a cash
shortage, the reduction in payments would be means tested, with high-income recipients of benefits
absorbing most or all of the reductions.”).
161
See Triage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
triage [https://perma.cc/Y5WN-DQLH] (in medicine, “triage” means “the sorting of and allocation of
157
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serve a disproportionate share of low-income beneficiaries, or rural hospitals that
would face a particularly acute risk of insolvency due to payment disruptions?
As a legal matter, it is difficult to predict with certainty whether courts
would find the agency had discretion to insulate some claimants. Medicare
reimbursement entails “tremendous complexity.” 162 Just as no law specifically
addresses what to do if the program is insolvent, the law is silent about how
much discretion the agency has in such a case. That said, there is some agency
precedent for the possibility of triage: Congress has, for several years, failed to
allocate the financial resources needed for Medicare to hold hearings within
the timeframe required by statute. 163 This has led to a multi-year backlog in
Medicare’s appeals process, 164 in which the agency has triaged among claimants, allowing beneficiary claimants to cut the line. 165 Although the backlog
itself has been subject to extensive litigation, the agency’s choice to triage in
this way has not been challenged in that litigation. 166
Despite the overarching uncertainty about this option, it is possible to
draw some important lessons about HHS’s discretion to triage among claimants in the event of insolvency. First, the extent of the agency’s discretion—the
laws and principles governing it—would depend significantly on the process
by which the agency made decisions about administering insolvency (the question confronted in Section A of this Part). 167 The best case for agency discretion to insulate some claimants from insolvency is if the agency promulgates
its policy in advance, through notice and comment rulemaking, and invokes its

treatment to patients . . . according to a system of priorities designed to maximize the number of survivors”).
162
See Cmty. Care Found. v. Thompson, 318 F.3d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing “enhance[d] . . . deference [to] the Secretary’s decision” in light of the “‘tremendous complexity’ of the
Medicare program” (quoting Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 1994))).
163
See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 102 & n.114 (2015)
(reporting Congress’s knowledge of the backlog in appeals but lack of motivation to resolve the problem).
164
See id. at 91 (recognizing that “at the beginning of 2014, half a million appeals and counting
were waiting for hearing,” with “that number [growing] throughout the year” (citing NANCY GRISWOLD, OFF. OF MEDICARE HEARINGS AND APPEALS (OMHA), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., MEDICARE APPELLANT FORUM (2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/omha/files/
appellant_forum_presentations.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX62-C5ZD]).
165
See id. (describing actions taken by the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals in an attempt to address the backlog).
166
The AHA and many hospitals have challenged the agency’s delay in holding hearings, but not
the agency’s decision to prioritize patient claims for more timely hearings. See generally, e.g., Am.
Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“seeking mandamus compelling [HHS] to
[facilitate Medicare appeals] in accordance with statutory timeline”).
167
See discussion supra Section II.A (outlining the procedural options available to plan for Medicare insolvency).
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catchall authority to adjust Medicare payments. 168 That adjustment authority is
broad and flexible, 169 so the agency would only need to justify any prioritization by reference to underlying goals of the Medicare statute. 170 In such a case,
the legality of the agency’s prioritization choices would rise or fall with any
challenge to its authority to implement a prospective solvency adjustment in
the first place.
The legal case for agency discretion to prioritize becomes much more
tenuous if HHS declines to invoke its statutory adjustment authority. This is
true especially if it waits to announce its policy until it is too late to proceed
through notice and comment rulemaking. The reason has to do with the nature
of the agency’s inherent authority to reduce (or delay) payments because it is
forced to do so by insolvency. This authority is a byproduct of the Appropriations Clause and Congress’ ability to command payment without appropriating
funds necessary to meet that command. 171 Unlike the agency’s discretion under
its statutory adjustment authorities, the extent to which it would have discretion in wielding this inherent authority to break the law is altogether unclear. 172
Courts might be sympathetic to arguments that a one-size-fits-all approach
is compelled in such a case because a one-size-fits-all approach would plausibly
minimize the extent of the breach from legal requirements. Regardless, it is almost certain that courts would hold that the agency, in administering insolvency,
must honor all pre-existing laws that it is possible to honor. 173 This would in168
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) (authority to promulgate “such other exceptions and adjustments to [IPPD] payment amounts . . . as the Secretary deems appropriate”); id. § 1395hh(a)–(b)
(requiring notice and comment rulemaking for “substantive” rules); see also id. § 1395l(t)(2)(E)
(providing authority to make “other adjustments as determined to be necessary to ensure equitable
payments”).
169
Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 891 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44–45, 48 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) “grants broad authority” and upholding adjustment of a hospital’s reimbursement rate), aff’d, 740 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
170
For example, the agency might exempt Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments on
the ground that DSH hospitals are the most vulnerable to funding shortfalls, pointing to the statutory
concern for that fact in the very existence of DSH payments.
171
See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 16–17 (“While the Constitution reserves to Congress the
power to permit Treasury expenditures via the Appropriations Clause, Congress has in many cases
delegated this power to the executive [(including executive agencies)].” (footnote omitted) (first citing
Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990); then citing United States v. MacCollom,
426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976); then citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850); and then
citing Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 269 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
172
See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option:
Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175,
1221–22 (2012) (discussing the question of executive discretion forced by competing statutory commands).
173
See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (accepting the HHS impossibility of compliance argument based on the mass settlement workaround itself being violative of the
statute). “[A] court may not require an agency to break the law . . . .” Id. (first citing Ala. Power Co. v.

2022]

Medicare “Bankruptcy”

1689

clude the statutory requirement that the agency make substantive changes in
Medicare policy only through notice and comment rulemaking. 174 In turn, this
would foreclose non-regulatory prioritization efforts that could be characterized
as “substantive” within the meaning of the statute, a broad category. 175
Hospitals (paid through Part A) and insurers (paid through Part C), the
two biggest Trust Fund claimants, are reimbursed through very different formulae and processes, providing a final lesson for the agency’s discretion to
prioritize. This could lead the agency to administer insolvency using an approach that privileges one set of claimants or the other. Its authority to do so
could be circumscribed, however, by a provision of the Medicare statute arguably requiring the agency to ensure that Part A and Part C reimbursements be
“actuarial[ly] equivalen[t].” 176 This provision may be pivotal in ensuring that
the agency does not administer insolvency in a way that hastens (by favoring
insurers) or slows (by favoring hospitals) the long-term trend of increased privatization in the program.
D. The $5.3 Trillion Dollar Question
How HHS would administer Medicare during insolvency and whether it
would delay payments or reduce them pro rata are important considerations,
but no question looms larger than that of judicial remedies. If Congress failed
to legislate a fix and Medicare became insolvent, then hospitals, insurers, and
other disappointed claimants could be counted on to seek judicial relief. Further, these parties would petition the courts to order that they be paid the full
amount for serving Medicare beneficiaries described in the statute. 177 Would
courts grant such a request, ordering payment despite the trust fund’s insolvency (and Congress’ failure to appropriate funds to cover the shortfall)? Probably,
but maybe not.

Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1979); and then citing NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 713 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)).
174
42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(b)(1) (“[T]he Secretary shall provide for notice of the proposed regulation
in the Federal Register and a period of not less than 60 days for public comment thereon.”).
175
Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1811 (2019) (holding that the phrase “substantive legal standard” in Medicare statute is broader than the “substantive rule[]” concept in APA (emphasis omitted)).
176
§ 1395w-23(a)(1)(C)(i) (“[T]he Secretary shall adjust the payment amount . . . [to Medicare
Advantage insurers] for such risk factors as age, disability status, gender, institutional status, and such
other factors . . . so as to ensure actuarial equivalence.”); UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Becerra, 16
F.4th 867, 870, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“The role of the actuarial-equivalence provision is to require
CMS to model a demographically and medically analogous beneficiary population in traditional Medicare to determine the prospective lump-sum payments to Medicare Advantage insurers.”).
177
§ 1395g(a) (requiring that providers be compensated for “services furnished by [them]”).
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An understanding of the Judgment Fund appropriation is essential to analyzing the question of whether courts might order payment. Courts do not automatically have the power under the Constitution to make funds available
from the federal Treasury. 178 Only Congress can do that, through an appropriation. This means that even when a court orders a federal agency to pay someone, the agency cannot comply with that order unless and until Congress appropriates the funds. 179 Thus, for much of the country’s history, actually getting
paid by suing the United States for damages required two steps. First, obtain a
court order of payment. 180 Second, obtain an appropriation from Congress to
satisfy the order. 181 Congress always honored such orders, but doing so was
burdensome; the first Congress was provided with over seven hundred petitions for remuneration. 182
For a variety of reasons, Congress in 1956 abandoned the practice of responding to individual court orders with appropriations legislation, enacting
the “Judgment Fund” appropriation. 183 The Judgment Fund is a blanket, permanent appropriation of “[n]ecessary amounts” necessary to honor federal
court judgments, as well as certain settlements negotiated by the Department
of Justice in the context of litigation.184 When Congress failed to fund statutory
obligations in the risk corridors, tribal support cost, and cost sharing reduction
programs, courts eventually made some payments available from the Judgment
Fund by ordering payment. 185 Unfortunately, in each case, these payments

178
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (granting Congress the power to appropriate Treasury
funds as an operation of law), with id. art. III (providing for no enumerated powers of the Judiciary
over the Treasury).
179
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 74 n.326 (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291
(1850)) (explaining that “courts cannot order a payment of funds that are not appropriated” by Congress).
180
Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 694 (1985).
181
Id. (“Congress had historically refused to enact a continuing appropriation for the payment of
all judgments, and the federal courts had refused to enforce payment without a specific appropriation.”
(footnote omitted) (citing Reeside, 52 U.S. at 290–91)).
182
Id. at 638.
183
Id. at 686 (explaining the congressional adoption of “a continuing appropriation for all judgments certified by the Comptroller General not in excess of $100,000” (citing the Automatic Payment
of Judgments Act, ch. 748, 70 Stat. 694 (1956) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1304))).
184
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a).
185
See Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1331 (2020) (ordering the
payment of the statutorily-mandated risk corridor payment); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567
U.S. 182, 193 (2012) (holding that the government was obligated to pay the tribes the full amount of
their contractual promise and could not escape this burden by failing to appropriate the funds); Sanford Health Plan v. United States, 969 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (requiring the government to
fulfill its obligation to reimburse providers).
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came several years after their original due date. 186 These precedents raise the
possibility that some or all of Medicare’s projected $5.3 trillion shortfall would
ultimately be paid through the Judgment Fund despite a congressional failure
to act. 187
The most significant determinant of the Judgment Fund’s availability
would be courts’ rulings on whether the Medicare statute entitles participating
providers and insurers to reimbursement for serving Medicare beneficiaries. As
to the first year of insolvency, courts applying current law would likely conclude that it does. As to both Part A for hospital reimbursement and Part C for
insurer reimbursement, the statute specifically commands the agency to reimburse and sets forth an intricate formula regarding the amount. 188 Courts have
found these features “money mandating” and sufficient to trigger the Judgment
Fund in past cases. 189 This is a powerful and likely insurmountable textual argument in favor of judicial relief.
At the same time, liability would not be certain. The past decade of health
policy litigation teaches that it would be a mistake to predict litigation outcomes with confidence, even when the legal arguments are one sided. 190 And
when it comes to the availability of the Judgment Fund to cover Medicare insolvency, the arguments are not quite one-sided. There is a plausible argument
that the statute conditions payment on the availability of the Hospital Insurance
186
See Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1316 (ordering risk corridors program payments
five years after they original came due between 2014 and 2016); Salazar, 567 U.S. at 202 (ordering
payment ten years after the original due date between 1994 and 2001); Sanford Health Plan, 969 F.3d
at 1372 (ordering payment three years after reimbursement was due in 2017).
187
THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS., 2019
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 67 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2019.
pdf [https://perma.cc/S2DR-3AEX] (estimating $5.3 trillion shortfall over the life of the program).
188
42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (mandating that the Part A “provider of services shall be paid . . . from the
Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the amounts so determined”); id. § 1395w-23(f) (“The payment
to a Medicare+Choice organization under this section . . . shall be made . . . .”); id. § 1395ww(d) (setting
forth a complicated formula to determine “[i]npatient hospital service payments on [the] basis of prospective rates”).
189
See, e.g., Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1329 n.13, 1331 (citing Moda Health Plan,
Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1320 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health
Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1308) (“In establishing the temporary Risk Corridors program, Congress created a rare money-mandating obligation requiring the Federal Government to make payments . . . .
[P]etitioners may seek to collect payment through a damages action in the Court of Federal Claims.”);
Sanford Health Plan, 969 F.3d at 1372–73 (“We conclude that Maine Community makes clear that the
cost-sharing-reduction reimbursement provision imposes an unambiguous obligation on the government to pay money and that the obligation is enforceable through a damages action in the Court of
Federal Claims . . . .”).
190
See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020) (recounting a decade of legal challenges to the Affordable
Care Act).
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Trust Fund by explicitly pointing to it as the source of required payments. 191
Moreover, there is a difficult but plausible argument that even if the statute
does not explicitly condition reimbursement on the availability of appropriations, such a condition is fairly discernible in the statute. 192 Arguably, this is
implied in: (1) the trust fund financing structure; 193 (2) the many partial but
incomplete measures Congress has taken to address the program’s solvency
over the decades; (3) the statute’s provisions mandating budget neutrality
while also forbidding courts from reviewing budget neutrality adjustments; 194
and (4) the fact that the statute refers to beneficiaries as “entitled” to benefits
over one hundred times, but refers to providers as “entitled” to reimbursement
only a few times. 195
As to what would happen in the years following the onset of insolvency,
the Judgment Fund question becomes even less certain. Providers and insurers
would have the statutory option to leave the Medicare program. Further, their
choice to participate would be made with an awareness of the fund’s insolvency and its corresponding impacts on reimbursement; indeed Part C insurers
might even explore the possibility of increasing premium bids to offset expected shortfalls. Judges have been open to arguments that contractors’ arguably voluntary choices to participate in analogous past cases affected their ability to seek damages. 196 They might be receptive to these arguments in adjudiSee, e.g., § 1395g(a) (“[T]he provider of services shall be paid . . . from the Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund . . . .”); id. § 1395w-23(f) (“The payment to a Medicare+Choice organization
. . . shall be made from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust Fund . . . .”). This argument is bolstered by language in the Judgment Fund
appropriation itself limiting its availability to situations “when . . . payment is not otherwise provided
for.” 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1).
192
See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.”).
193
42 U.S.C. § 1395(g).
194
See, e.g., id. § 1395w-23 (requiring budget neutrality while limiting the opportunity for judicial review).
195
Compare JOST, supra note 125, at 31 (“‘[P]ersons entitled to benefits’ . . . [is] a phrase that
appears [in the Medicare statute as a reference to beneficiaries] over 100 times . . . .”), with § 1395w23 (referring to providers as “entitled” in a few instances).
196
See Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1332 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“These companies chose to participate in an Affordable Care Act program that they thought
would be profitable.”); Cmty. Health Choice, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (applying the mitigation theory to reduce a damages award for insurers arising from “costsharing reduction” disappropriation), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 141 S. Ct. 2796 (2021); cf. Se. Ark. Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 1 F. Supp. 3d 915, 925 (E.D. Ark.
2014) (“The only compulsion to provide hospice services is imposed by virtue of [plaintiff’s] voluntary choice to provide services under the hospice program.”). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit summed up the concept of mitigation as follows: “Under common-law principles, the injured
party may not recover damages for any ‘loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue
risk, burden or humiliation.’” Cmty. Health Choice, Inc., 970 F.3d at 1375–76 (quoting RESTATE191
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cating Medicare bankruptcy as well. That said, the mitigation question has not
been addressed definitively by the Supreme Court 197 and its applicability to
Medicare providers and insurers is debatable—hence the difficulty of predicting its resolution. 198
Importantly, HHS and the government could substantially alter the likelihood that courts would order payment of Medicare’s shortfall through the
Judgment Fund. They could do so through their statements, their settlement
decisions, and their regulatory choices.
First, HHS could either increase or decrease the likelihood of recovery
through the statements it makes in its regulatory preambles, provider agreements, and insurer agreements. Statements indicating that full statutory
amounts would be owed would tend to increase the likelihood of recovery, and
vice versa. Such statements might receive direct Chevron deference because of
the agency’s role in administering Medicare. This may depend on the outcome
of American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, which the United States Supreme
Court is expected to decide soon after this writing. 199 But even absent deference, statements of obligation from the agency may be seen by courts as supporting breach of contract or other damages theories. 200 Similarly, statements
disclaiming obligation may undermine breach of contract and other damages
theories in their own right. 201
Second, the Department of Justice could increase the likelihood and generosity of a Judgment Fund payout by settling Medicare bankruptcy cases on
favorable terms—taking advantage of the Judgment Fund’s alternative availaMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981)) (first citing 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 12.6(1), at 127 (2d ed. 1993); and then citing Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 11 (1900)).

197
The mitigation issue was not presented in the risk corridors case, so it was not resolved by the
Supreme Court in Maine Community Health Options. 140 S. Ct. at 1308. This Article takes up that
and a related case and courts’ role in Medicare bankruptcy infra Section IV.B.1. See discussion infra
Section IV.B (recommending the Supreme Court approach the entitlement question in upcoming cases
with awareness of its future implications for Medicare bankruptcy).
198
In Community Health Choice, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
found the mitigation theory applicable to ACA insurers only after concluding that contract law principles should apply to the government’s relationship with such insurers. 970 F.3d at 1374. This conclusion was based in part on the fact that the ACA does not set out remedies for insurers disappointed
with their payments from the government. Id. This logic would not necessarily apply to Medicare
providers or insurers seeking additional payment, as the statute provides elaborate remedies for them
to do so. See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text (describing Medicare’s elaborate procedural remedies and the requirement that they be exhausted before pursuing judicial action).
199
141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021) (granting petition for certiorari).
200
Analogous HHS statements were cited in the risk corridor cases. See Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1324–25.
201
See Samuel R. Maizel & Jody A. Bedenbaugh, The Medicare Provider Agreement: Is It a
Contract or Not? And Why Does Anyone Care?, 71 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1207–08 (2016) (discussing
questions about whether “the Medicare Provider Agreement is a contract,” with implications for liquidation of health care entities).
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bility for compromise settlements. 202 This might be done either by openly
agreeing to a favorable settlement or by displacing career lawyers in favor of
political appointees who are willing to support a settlement providing payouts
more generous than warranted. 203 There are probably no serious external constraints on the Department of Justice’s discretion to settle claims, 204 but institutional and ethical considerations counsel against abuse of that discretion. 205
Third, HHS could reduce the likelihood of Judgment Fund liability by using its rulemaking authority over Medicare payments to prospectively reduce
payment rates uniformly by an amount sufficient to avoid a shortfall—perhaps
promising a subsequent upward adjustment should Congress provide funds.
There is a strong argument that the agency already has statutory authority to
make such a downward solvency adjustment, 206 though there are strong counter-arguments as well. 207 A solvency adjustment, if indeed legally authorized,

31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3).
See Paul F. Figley, The Judgment Fund: America’s Deepest Pocket & Its Susceptibility to
Executive Branch Misuse, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 148 (2015) (expressing concerns about “sue
and settle” environmental litigation and other Judgment Fund practices).
204
Courts have held that the government’s decision to settle an individual affirmative case is only
reviewable under specified circumstances. See Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589, 591–92 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“A decision that is committed to agency discretion by law may nonetheless be reviewable
where the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
833 n.4 (1985))). Further, there is no apparent reason that a case challenging the government’s decision to settle (or decline to defend) a defensive case would fare any better. See T. Patrick Cordova,
The Duty to Defend and Federal Court Standing: Resolving a Collision Course, 73 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 109, 152–54 (2017) (assuming that any rule governing government’s defense of litigation would “not [be] an externally enforceable requirement”). That said, if the government adopted a
transparent and blanket policy of favorably settling Medicare solvency litigation, plaintiffs might
argue this would allow the policy to be reviewed. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (suggesting judicial review would be available where an agency had “‘consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” (citing Adams
v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc))). Hence the “probably” qualifier above.
205
See Figley, supra note 203, at 179–200 (sounding the alarm regarding “[r]aids on the Judgment Fund”).
206
See 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) (“The Secretary shall provide by regulation for such other
exceptions and adjustments to such payment amounts under this subsection as the Secretary deems
appropriate.”); id. § 1395w-23(a)(1)(C)(i) (providing that “the Secretary shall adjust the payment
amount” for Medicare Advantage for enumerated factors and “such other factors as the Secretary
determines to be appropriate . . . so as to ensure actuarial equivalence”).
207
It is hard to argue that solvency is not an “appropriate” consideration for the agency, especially given the many statutory provisions mandating the Secretary consider budget limitations in setting
payment amounts. Providers might argue, however, that authority to “adjust” payments is limited by
text and context to modest changes in amounts and that a significant downward solvency reduction
(approaching 20% according to Trustees’ estimates) would cease to be an “adjustment.” See The Outlook for Major Federal Trust Funds: 2020 to 2030, supra note 143 (predicting a nineteen percent
Trust Fund shortfall by the year 2030).
202
203
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would foreclose the Judgment Fund by reducing the amounts actually owed
under the statute.
The implications of this question are huge. If the Judgment Fund is available, then the payment disruptions associated with insolvency would be temporary, lasting only for the months or years between the onset of insolvency and
the ultimate judicial resolution. If not, these disruptions would be permanent,
lasting as long as Congress’s failure to act.
There would be significant fiscal-political economy impacts as well. If
the Judgment Fund is available for the full amount of the shortfall, then Medicare bankruptcy would entail a painful, chaotic, and wasteful transition from a
capped Trust Fund financing model to a hybrid model drawing on both the
capped Trust Fund and uncapped general federal revenues (or new federal
debt). That would, in turn, put all the pressure of future budgetary battles on
advocates for less-favored federal spending programs whose existence and
generosity depend on congressional action. 208 Additional pressure would, of
course, come from taxpayer and deficit control advocates. 209 It would give
Medicare providers, insurers, and beneficiaries a huge leg up in these budgetary battles. If the Judgment Fund were available, then they would need only to
restrain change in the law, which neither Congress nor the President can do
unilaterally, to ensure devotion of an increasing share of GDP to Medicare as
health care costs climb.
On the other hand, if the Judgment Fund were unavailable or available
only for one year’s shortfall, the political dynamics of Medicare vis-à-vis competing federal resource priorities would be inverted. If Medicare’s boosters
wanted the program’s share of GDP to grow with rising health care costs in
that case, they would need to cobble together major reform legislation capable
of becoming law. For better or worse, this would surely entail significant concessions to supporters of other programs, as well as advocates of deficit reduction and lower taxes.
E. Which Court (and What Kind of Relief)?
The substantive question whether courts would order relief from the
Judgment Fund is undoubtedly important. But so too is an additional, proce208
Matthew B. Lawrence, Subordination and Separation of Powers, 131 YALE L.J. 78, 104
(2021) (describing the fragility of annually funded discretionary programs).
209
Cf. Jessica Banthin, Deputy Assistant Dir., Cong. Budget Off., Presentation to a Conference
Organized by the Center for Sustainable Health Spending, Washington, DC: Health Care Spending
Today and in the Future: Impacts on Federal Deficits and Debt 25 (July 18, 2017), https://www.
cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/presentation/52913-presentation.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5HHK-DJYY] (presenting the correlation between the growth in Medicare spending and the Federal Debt).
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dural question: What court would hear the case, and what kind of relief might
it order? There are two very different procedural avenues through which typical shorted Medicare claimants might seek relief. 210 First, judicial relief could
be sought retrospectively, with a resolution months or years after the fact, in
damages actions in the Court of Federal Claims. Second, judicial relief could
be sought prospectively, in actions seeking injunctive relief in federal district
court. Intricacies of the jurisdictional provisions that govern access to these
courts make them, to some extent, mutually exclusive.
The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court set up by Congress to
resolve a specialized group of claims, including damages claims against the
government. 211 Its equitable power (including the power to order injunctive
relief) is severely limited, perhaps nonexistent. 212 Its decisions may be appealed
to the federal circuit courts, then to the Supreme Court. 213
Prior disappropriations have been litigated in the Court of Federal Claims.
In the tribal support cost, risk corridor, and cost sharing reduction disappropriations, litigation began there before ultimately reaching the Supreme
Court. 214 Although it might be assumed that Medicare insolvency litigation
could and would undoubtedly proceed in that court, this assumption would be
too hasty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 2005,
A third route, in addition to those discussed above, might be available for some plaintiffs.
Specifically, hospitals that became insolvent themselves could potentially press their entitlement to
reimbursement in bankruptcy court. The circuits are split over whether section 405(h) precludes bankruptcy court jurisdiction over unexhausted reimbursement claims. Compare Benjamin v. U.S. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 932 F.3d 293, 296–97 (5th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging a split with the Third, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits created by finding that section 405(h) does not preclude bankruptcy
court jurisdiction), with In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
that section 405(h) does preclude bankruptcy court jurisdiction of unexhausted claims). See generally
Samuel R. Maizel & Michael B. Potere, Killing the Patient to Cure the Disease: Medicare’s Jurisdictional Bar Does Not Apply to Bankruptcy Courts, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 19 (2015) (arguing for
jurisdiction); John Aloysius Cogan, Jr. & Rodney A. Johnson, Administrative Channeling Under the
Medicare Act Clarified: Illinois Council, Section 405(h), and the Application of Congressional Intent,
9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125 (2000) (developing an argument against jurisdiction). In a circuit court on
the side of this split finding jurisdiction, it could be possible to adjudicate a hospital’s entitlement to
full reimbursement at relatively early stages of the reimbursement process.
211
United States Court of Federal Claims: The People’s Court, U.S. CT. OF FED. CLAIMS, http://
www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/uscfc_court_history_brochure_20210325.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2QQK-9QLJ].
212
See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988) (“The Claims Court does not have the
general equitable powers of a district court to grant prospective relief.”).
213
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f) (allowing for a Court of Federal Claims decision to be appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within sixty days of adjudication).
214
See, e.g., Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1318 (2020) (noting the
original filing was in the Court of Federal Claims); Cmty. Health Choice v. United States, 970 F.3d
1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (same), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Me. Cmty. Health Options,
141 S. Ct. 2796 (2021); Sanford Health Plan v. United States, 969 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(same).
210
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held in Wilson ex rel. Estate of Wilson v. United States that the Court of Federal
Claims does not have jurisdiction over lawsuits that “arise[] under the Medicare [statute].” 215 This is because of the Medicare statute’s jurisdictional channeling positions that tee up district court actions. 216 There is a strong argument
that a challenge to HHS’s reduction or delay of payment of a Medicare claim
due to insolvency would also “arise under” the Medicare statute, and so be ineligible for adjudication in the Court of Federal Claims. 217
As for federal district courts, they are tightly constrained in their ability to
order the government to pay money. The Administrative Procedure Act’s
catch-all waiver of sovereign immunity, which by default blocks lawsuits
against the government, applies only for: (1) “relief other than money damages”; 218 and (2) only as to claims that have “no other adequate remedy in a
court” (such as, perhaps, the Court of Federal Claims). 219
These limitations might or might not preclude Medicare insolvency litigation in federal district court. In 1988, The United States Supreme Court held in
Bowen v. Massachusetts that a claim against the government may seek money
but not “money damages,” if money is the “very thing” the government has allegedly failed to provide. 220 Moreover, it held that a retrospective damages remedy, even if technically available, is not necessarily “adequate.” 221 Indeed, the
Supreme Court held in Bowen that states could sue for allegedly-denied Medicaid payments to which they were statutorily entitled in federal district court. 222
The Court reasoned the states sought not “damages” but compliance with the

405 F.3d 1002, 1010, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See id. at 1010–12, 1016 (“[T]he scheme for comprehensive administrative and judicial review
set forth in the Medicare Act preempts Tucker Act jurisdiction over [the] claim for reimbursement.”);
Allegheny Techs. Inc. v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 126, 134 (2019) (applying Wilson in finding no
jurisdiction over Medicare claims).
217
See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1975) (holding that a claim “arises under” the
Medicare statute if the statute “provides both the standing and substantive basis for the [claim]”).
218
5 U.S.C. § 702.
219
Id. § 704.
220
487 U.S. 879, 895 (1988) (quoting Md. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (first citing § 702; and then citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135 (1973))) (“The fact that in the present case it is money rather than in-kind
benefits that pass from the federal government to the states . . . cannot transform the nature of the
relief sought—specific relief, not relief in the form of damages.” (quoting Md. Dep’t of Hum. Res.,
763 F.2d at 1446 (citing Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 104 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
221
Id. at 905 (citing Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Bd. of the U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 815 F.2d 778, 789 (1st Cir. 1987) (Coffin, J., concurring)).
222
Id. at 907. “[T]he nature of the controversies that give rise to disallowance decisions typically
involve state governmental activities that a district court would be in a better position to understand
and evaluate . . . .” Id. at 907–08.
215
216
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statute, and that their need to plan in advance how to administer their Medicaid
programs meant that an ex-post damages remedy would not be “adequate.” 223
With prior disappropriations having been litigated through the Court of
Federal Claims, it is impossible to say with assurance that the federal district
court path would be viable to litigate insolvency in Medicare. Moreover, despite its apparent breadth, courts have tended to read Bowen narrowly. 224 That
said, although there are superficial legal obstacles to relief via the district
court, Bowen demonstrates that these arguments are not insurmountable, as
does Wilson. 225 Plaintiffs hoping to establish federal district court jurisdiction
in Medicare insolvency litigation could argue that the Court of Federal Claims
would be inadequate both due to its jurisdictional limitations noted in Wilson
and the plaintiffs’ need to know the status of their Medicare claims to plan
their operations. 226 If this path were open, the Judgment Fund would be available to fund compliance with any resulting court order, as it is for other court
judgments. 227
The procedural path of Medicare bankruptcy litigation would not apparently impact whether courts would ultimately order payment from the Judgment Fund or not. 228 It would nonetheless be important, because prospective
relief in federal district court would likely proceed much more quickly than
damages actions in the Court of Federal Claims. The speed of district court
actions would depend significantly on the form of HHS’s decisions altering

223
Id. at 905–07 (“It is no answer to suggest that a State will not be harmed as long as it retains
the money, because its interest in planning future programs . . . may be more pressing than the monetary amount in dispute.”).
224
See Gregory C. Sisk, The Jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and Forum Shopping in
Money Claims Against the Federal Government, 88 IND. L.J. 83, 93 (2013) (tracing courts’ limiting
interpretations of Bowen); cf. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bowen v. Massachusetts: The “Money Damages Exception” to the Administrative Procedure Act and Grant-in-Aid Litigation, 21 URB. LAW. 557,
574–75 (1989) (suggesting Bowen may be read to allow grant-in-aid litigation to proceed in district
court even when seeking money).
225
See Wilson ex rel. Est. of Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Court of Federal Claims “lacks jurisdiction . . . [to evaluate a] claim aris[ing] under
the Medicare Act”); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 907 (suggesting the district court may be a better forum for
disallowance claims).
226
See Wilson, 405 F.3d at 1016 (finding jurisdictional boundaries to bringing Medicare claims in
the Court of Federal Claims); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 907 (suggesting the district court may be more accommodating to the state’s interest in planning future programs).
227
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (incorporating by reference 28 U.S.C. § 2414). The Attorney General is authorized by statute to pay settlements for imminent claims against the United States out of the
Judgment Fund. 28 U.S.C. § 2414.
228
Ultimately the core question of statutory interpretation would remain the same, and regardless
of which court initially heard the $5.3 trillion dollar case, the Supreme Court would presumably take
it up in light of its magnitude and import for Medicare, health policy, and the United States budget.
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payment, 229 but may potentially begin immediately upon adoption of insolvency measures and be quickly adjudicated on summary judgment. 230 By contrast,
a suit in the Court of Federal Claims could not proceed until damages were
actually inflicted, delaying by months or years the course of litigation. 231
III. REWRITING THE STARS
Thinking about the confusion and controversy that would surround the
administration of insolvency in Medicare naturally motivates thinking about
immediate steps to avoid insolvency altogether. It is therefore unsurprising and
entirely appropriate that much attention is paid during insolvency crises to the
question of how to address the program’s immediate needs and render it solvent, either by decreasing spending or increasing revenue. 232
An unfortunate side effect of this focus on immediacy in avoiding insolvency, however, is that it has left what would or should happen if Medicare
becomes insolvent shrouded in mystery. Yet, as this Part explains, that mystery
itself matters—indeed, it matters even if Medicare never actually becomes insolvent.
This Part problematizes the overarching theme that runs throughout current law’s approach to Medicare insolvency, as reflected in each of the questions identified and analyzed in Part II. It is motivated by the question whether
it is right for the Medicare statute and regulations to remain silent on the possibility of insolvency or its implications, leaving its administration uncertain,
to be determined by the agency and courts if and when it occurs. This Part responds to that question with a resounding “no,” and recommends that (hopefully prophylactic) rules to govern Medicare bankruptcy be established in adSee discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B (weighing the consequences of delaying Medicare
reimbursement payments or continuing them on schedule pro rata).
230
See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 29 F. Supp. 3d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2014) (applying a
more deferential summary judgment standard to agency action, determining whether such “action is
supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review”
(quoting Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Richards v. INS, 554
F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977))), appeal dismissed, Nos. 06-5419, 07-5004, 2007 WL
1125716, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 2007)), aff’d sub nom. Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 782 F.3d
707 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Medicare claimants might seek preliminary relief, but it is highly doubtful that
district courts have authority to order payment from the Judgment Fund on a preliminary basis because the Judgment Fund appropriation is itself available only for payment of “final” judgments and
because of the strictures of the Appropriations Clause. 31 U.S.C. § 1304; see Lawrence, supra note
11, at 37 (describing the legal basis for a conclusion that the Appropriations Clause forbids preliminary relief regarding payment of damages when the court has “doubt about the availability of appropriations” (citing California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2017))).
231
See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text (reciting funding dispute cases originally
filed in the Court of Federal Claims).
232
See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text (describing the often short-term reforms to
Medicare imposed during insolvency crises seeking to increase revenue or, more likely, cut costs).
229
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vance. Part IV will turn to the respective roles of HHS, Congress, and the
courts in effectuating this recommendation. 233
Section A of this Part discusses how advanced clarification on the administration of Medicare insolvency would make it less unfair and harmful if it did
occur, even if the $5.3 trillion question of liability remained unanswered. 234
Section B highlights that such clarification would predictably decrease the
likelihood that insolvency will occur in the first place, by facilitating preventive compromise in Congress. 235 Finally, Section C explains that clarification
of the liability question itself could make the threat of insolvency more effective at stimulating compromise and cost control in the Medicare program. 236
This would be accomplished by directing the risk of insolvency to the program’s “least cost avoiders”—the powerful economic interests who shape
Medicare policymaking.
A. Mitigating the Damage
The first reason Medicare should have explicit rules governing insolvency
is that if insolvency did occur such rules would reduce its harms and make
their distribution more fair. To see why, it is helpful to begin by mapping the
likely harms of insolvency, assuming that it follows the “most likely” possibility as to each of the major questions discussed in Part II. 237
Based on current law’s most likely scenario, the agency would announce its
insolvency policy at the last minute after taking extraordinary measures to delay
insolvency’s offset 238 and would opt to delay payments across the board.239 After
a year or two, doctrinal and exhaustion obstacles would be resolved, and
claimants would seek damages from the Judgment Fund in the Court of Federal Claims. Their suits would progress to the federal circuit courts and then to
See discussion infra Part IV.
See infra notes 237–274 and accompanying text.
235
See infra notes 275–289 and accompanying text.
236
See infra notes 290–328 and accompanying text.
237
See discussion supra Part II (discussing the most consequential questions for administering
insolvency: (1) when and how to promulgate Medicare policy addressing administration in the event
of bankruptcy; (2) whether to pay claims in full but subject to an increasingly-long delay or to pay all
claims as usual but reduced pro rata; (3) whether to insulate some claimants from insolvency’s effects;
(4) whether shorted providers could obtain recovery from the Judgment Fund; and (5) whether any
such recovery would come through prospective injunctions in federal district courts or retrospective
damages orders in the Court of Federal Claims).
238
See Hyman, supra note 20, at 1182 (“[L]egislative sloth, confirmed by past history, ensures
that any solution will be deferred until a true crisis emerges . . . .”); supra notes 120–137 and accompanying text (acknowledging that HHS has historically addressed financial crises in a slow and ad-hoc
manner, leading to confusion among providers).
239
See discussion supra Section II.B (suggesting pro rata payments may pose a problem in light
of the actuarial equivalence requirement).
233
234
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the Supreme Court, ultimately gaining success. A final “win” in court would
largely end the ongoing disruption of insolvency, but it would not undo the
damage done. As the health policy world—and, at times, the country—waited
for HHS action and for the definitive resolution of lawsuits, providers and insurers would have had to endure months or years of lost revenues and uncertainty. 240 This is almost precisely what happened in the risk corridors and tribal
support cost disappropriations. 241
The real-world harms in this most-likely scenario would emerge slowly,
and perhaps behind the scenes if some struggling hospitals, nursing homes, other
providers, and impacted insurers were reluctant to publicize their financial precarity. The harms would nonetheless be severe—and felt most acutely by the
least-wealthy providers and communities. Insolvency’s direct impact would
hamper reimbursement for providers, insurers, and other service providers,

See discussion supra Sections II.D, II.E (illustrating the circumstances that providers would
face in light of HHS’s failure to prepare for insolvency); see also Laura N. Coordes, Reorganizing
Healthcare Bankruptcy, 61 B.C. L. REV. 419, 421 (2020) (“The healthcare industry regularly grapples
with numerous problems, including increased competition, legislative uncertainty, changing payment
models, higher pharmaceutical costs, and rising wages.” (citing Mark G. Douglas, Focus on Health
Care Provider Bankruptcies, JONES DAY (Sept.–Oct. 2017), http://www.jonesday.com/Focus-onHealth-Care-Provider-Bankruptcies-10-01-2017/ [https://perma.cc/H5RW-ELGF])).
241
In the risk corridors case, the wait pending judgment put many insurers out of business and
effectively collapsed the ACA’s promising “co-op” program, which had fueled the creation of dozens
of startups that were too financially vulnerable to endure an unexpected loss of revenue. Brief of Amicus Curiae: The National Ass’n of Insurance Commissioners in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12–
13, Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1994), 2017 WL
4077798, at *12–13 (noting that “only six of the 24 CO-OPs operating at peak participation were still
in business” because of risk corridors disappropriation), rev’d sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options v.
United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020); see Watchdog Urges Continued Oversight of Troubled Co-Ops,
CQ HEALTHBEAT (Sept. 12, 2017), reprinted in Watchdog Urges Continued Oversight of Troubled
Co-ops, NEWSBANK (Sept. 12, 2017), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/apps/
news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/166FDD840C698938&f=basic [https://perma.
cc/J456-FAQG] (describing co-op bankruptcies). The larger insurers were able to weather the disruption, however, and could move in and assume the territory and business of the now-defunct small
players. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra, at 9–10 (“[T]he market is populated by these disadvantaged insurers, while other financially stronger insurers are disincentivized from participating.”).
Years later, the Supreme Court ordered payment in full on all the unpaid claims from the Judgment
Fund—too late for the bankrupt insurers, but not for the large players. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140
S. Ct. at 1331. Similarly, in the tribal support cost case, tribes were forced to reduce services for
members while they waited—twenty-five years—for their billion-dollar case to make its way through
the courts, to the Supreme Court, and eventually, to payment of damages. Press Release, Indian Affs.,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior, Justice Departments Announce $940 Million Landmark Settlement
with Nationwide Class of Tribes and Tribal Entities (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/
as-ia/opa/online-press-release/interior-justice-departments-announce-940-million-landmark-settlement
[https://perma.cc/8XAX-HP2F]; Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 201 (2012).
240
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which in this scenario, would be delayed by roughly two months in the first year,
four in the second, and so on depending on the extent of the shortfall. 242
Past disappropriations of other health programs, along with rate cuts and
revenue shocks in Medicare, illustrate how providers would respond to an extended delay (or reduction) in reimbursements, and thus what the disruption’s
ultimate effects would be. The most pronounced impacts would be on hospitals
and other providers reimbursed mostly through Part A, and so dependent on
the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, with somewhat diluted impacts on Medicare Advantage insurers (who would see impacts only for that share of Medicare Advantage payments associated with inpatient hospital stays). 243 These
providers would respond in four ways depending on their customer mix, financial position, and the competitiveness of their markets. This would ultimately
create a broad array of downstream effects on the health care system extending
far beyond Medicare.
First, the most financially precarious providers would be rendered insolvent themselves—unable to stay afloat without timely payment of their anticipated Medicare reimbursements. 244 Such providers would either shutter or be
forced to merge with larger, better-financed entities, further fueling concentration in health care markets. 245 Provider insolvencies would, in turn, limit acSee The Outlook for Major Federal Trust Funds: 2020 to 2030, supra note 143. This estimate
is based on CBO predictions of a 17% shortfall in the first year rising to a 19% shortfall by 2030. See
id.; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
243
See 42 U.S.C. 1395w-23(f) (providing that payment for Medicare Advantage insurers shall be
made from the HI Trust Fund “in such proportion as the Secretary determines reflects the relative
weight that benefits under Part A and under Part B represents of the actuarial value of the total benefits under this subchapter”); see also supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (describing interaction
of trust funds).
244
Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 241, at 12 (“It’s not that they couldn’t be made into
viable businesses: it’s that they couldn’t last long enough to reach that point.” (quoting Tim Worstall,
The Problem with Health Care Coops: No Capitalists to Absorb the Losses, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/26/the-problem-with-health-care-coops-no-capitaliststo-absorb-the-losses/?sh=5e57a97b7155 [https://perma.cc/LW9K-UQE7])). For example, when the
ACA’s risk corridors subsidy was disappropriated, more than a dozen health insurance companies
entered the insolvency process. See Sally Pipes, Obamacare’s Co-Op Disaster: Only 7 Remain, FORBES
(July 25, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2016/07/25/obamacares-co-op-disaster-anunfunny-comedy-of-errors/?sh=d5244195d5b4 [https://perma.cc/YU95-66EZ] (“Just seven of the
original 23 co-ops are still standing.”).
245
A concern about hospital bankruptcies associated with lost Medicare revenue due to the coronavirus pandemic prompted Congress and HHS to make hundreds of billions in aid available to offset
the pandemic’s temporary reduction in net demand for hospital services. This included direct stimulus
from Congress. One hundred billion dollars was allotted for providers in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 368–75
(2020). Seventy-five billion dollars was allotted from the Paycheck Protection Program and Heath
Care Enhancement Act. Paycheck Protection Program and Heath Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No.
116-139, 134 Stat. 620, 620–30 (2020). Finally, an estimated $68 billion of the $520 billion for the
paycheck protection program was allotted for providers. Keeping American Workers Paid and Em242
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cess for all patients in impacted communities, either directly in the case of
hospital closures or indirectly due to increased costs. 246 Affordability, associated with the loss of competition among providers and insurers due to merger
and closure, would therefore be reduced. 247
Second, some providers may simply choose to exit the Medicare program,
refusing to accept Medicare from their patients, at least for the duration of insolvency. Medicare patients are a critical revenue source for most providers, 248
making it doubtful that enough would leave for access to be meaningfully impacted across the board—only one percent of providers refuse to accept Medicare. 249 Access impacts would nonetheless be important, however, in two domains. In rural and low-income communities already struggling with access, 250
ployed Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 286, 286–313 (2020). It also included billions in “advance” Medicare payments from HHS; the agency increased eligible hospitals’ payments in the short
term to help them stay afloat, while requiring repayment against future claims in the years to come.
See Fact Sheet: Repayment Terms for Accelerated and Advance Payments Issued to Providers and
Suppliers During Covid-19 Emergency, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/accelerated-and-advanced-payments-fact-sheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q646-27UJ] (outlining “[e]ligibility and [r]epayment” criteria for COVID-19 advances to
providers). Hospitals received advance payments of at least $100 billion through the program. Juliette
Cubanski, Karyn Schwartz, Jeannie Fuglesten Biniek & Tricia Neuman, Medicare Accelerated and
Advance Payments for COVID-19 Revenue Loss: More Time to Repay, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8,
2020), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-accelerated-and-advance-payments-forcovid-19-revenue-loss-more-time-to-repay/ [https://perma.cc/D7H8-DH3A].
246
See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 241, at 9–10, 12 (citing Rising Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the U.S. H. Oversight
& Gov’t Reform Subcomm. on Health Care, Benefits, & Admin. Rules, 114th Cong. 6 (2016) (testimony of Al Redmer, Jr., Comm’r, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs) (emphasizing how the failure of risk
corridors payments to materialize ultimately impacts consumers by increasing costs and driving providers and insurers from the market).
247
See Health Care Industry Consolidation: What Is Happening, Why It Matters, and What Public Agencies Might Want to Do About It: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 115th Cong. 1, 6–7 (2018) (testimony of Leemore S. Dafny,
Professor, Harvard Bus. Sch & Harvard John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t) (discussing price increases
and evidence of lower quality health care in highly concentrated markets).
248
See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK 2018: TRENDS AFFECTING HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 39 chart 4.5 (2018), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-07/2018-ahachartbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/B682-GP7Q] (noting that Medicare made up 40.8% of hospital costs
as of 2016).
249
Nancy Ochieng, Karyn Schwartz & Tricia Neuman, How Many Physicians Have Opted-Out of
the Medicare Program?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.kff.org/report-section/
how-many-physicians-have-opted-out-of-the-medicare-program-tables/ [https://perma.cc/HBQ9-JQFY]
(providing data on physicians who do not participate in the Medicare program).
250
Emily A. Benfer, Seema Mohapatra, Lindsay F. Wiley & Ruqaiijah Yearby, Health Justice Strategies to Combat the Pandemic: Eliminating Discrimination, Poverty, and Health Disparities During and
After COVID-19, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 122, 141–42 (2020) (“[H]ealth care institutions have closed hospitals in low-income communities and communities of color to relocate in more
affluent communities as a result of ‘neutral’ policies that disproportionately harmed low-income
communities and communities of color.” (citing ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOCOLAR, CLOSING HOS-
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even small numbers of providers exiting the program could mean severe shortages. 251 And in fields where providers already decline participation in Medicare at significant rates—such as psychiatry (7.2% currently opt out), reconstructive surgery (3.6%), and neurology (2.8%)—a significant proportion of
providers could opt out, or avoid treating patients in inpatient settings. 252 Of
course, providers exiting Medicare would increase the concentration of the
markets they left behind, at least for Medicare patients. 253
Third, providers would be forced to find ways to increase revenue or reduce costs, at least until the courts ultimately resolved the damages question—
probably in providers’ favor. 254 Those in competitive markets could do so in
desirable ways, such as by cutting wasteful care, unnecessary investment, or
excessive executive or provider salaries. 255 They could also do so in undesirable ways, however, such as by limiting charitable services for the indigent,256
NEW YORK STATE WON’T SAVE MONEY BUT WILL HARM ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
(2006), https://www.bu.edu/sph/files/2015/05/Sager-Hospital-Closings-Short-Report-20Nov06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AB5J-FJKQ])); Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 247–51 (2018) (outlining disparities in rural health care).
251
See State and Federal Efforts to Enhance Access to Basic Health Care, The COMMONWEALTH
FUND, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/state-and-federal-effortsenhance-access-basic-health-care [https://perma.cc/HL79-4PUW] (“Hampering access to care is a
shortage of primary care physicians, nurses, dentists, and other health personnel, particularly in lowincome urban and rural communities.”).
252
Ochieng et al., supra note 249 (providing data on provider participation in the Medicare program by field).
253
See United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2017) (concluding that
for insurance plan merger analysis, the relevant market should be seen as “traditional Medicare” and
“Medicare Advantage,” not all of Medicare).
254
James Robinson, Hospitals Respond to Medicare Payment Shortfalls by Both Shifting Costs and
Cutting Them, Based on Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1265, 1266 (2011) (“The choice between revenue enhancement and cost reduction will become more acute as the federal government
seeks to reduce its budget deficit in part by reducing Medicare payments to hospitals.”).
255
See id. at 1270 (questioning “whether . . . costs [will be reduced] through better management of
capacity, technology, and staffing” for hospitals in competitive markets, or by less desirable means).
256
When hospital Medicare reimbursements were cut across the board by 2% to 4% due to Congress’s failure to avoid the “sequestration” crisis device in 2013, hospital association lobbyists complained that the cuts would ultimately harm patients by reducing such charitable services. See CONG.
BUDGET OFF., ESTIMATED IMPACT OF AUTOMATIC BUDGET ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES SPECIFIED
IN THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT 2 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress2011-2012/reports/09-12-BudgetControlAct_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R36-NL95] (reporting on the
Medicare reductions between 2013 and 2021); Janie Lorber, Pressure Points: The Sequester and Medicare Reimbursements, ROLL CALL (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.rollcall.com/2013/02/26/pressurepoints-the-sequester-and-medicare-reimbursements/ [https://perma.cc/56CL-ANZU] (reporting the
hospital labor groups appeal to Congress because “[l]ower payments . . . limit the ability of hospitals
and other providers to care for society’s more vulnerable populations, including seniors and lowincome patients”); Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane, The Big Sequester Gamble: How Badly Will the
Cuts Hurt?, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-big-sequestergamble-how-badly-will-the-cuts-hurt/2013/02/23/be0c44e2-7c4e-11e2-82e8-61a46c2cde3d_story.
PITALS IN
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increasing the aggressiveness of their collection practices, 257 laying off employees, 258 and reducing the services they provide to patients. 259 Providers with
market power in concentrated markets, meanwhile, could be expected to increase their private-sector rates and thereby pass the cost onto those enrolled in
private insurance plans. 260
Fourth, wealthy, well-resourced providers could bank on the likelihood
that disrupted payments would ultimately be ordered by courts in full, with
interest. 261 This would provide them the opportunity to continue business as
usual, weather the shortfall, and use the opportunity to gain market share over
competitors who lacked that financial flexibility. This poses a danger that wellresourced hospitals and other providers would use Medicare’s insolvency as an
opportunity to increase their market share further. Additionally, it provides yet
another reason to believe that insolvency in the program would serve as a driver of increased concentration in the health care marketplace, 262 with lasting
effects on the cost of and access to health care. 263
As for Medicare Advantage insurers, the most dramatic result would be
decisions to increase bids or opt out of the program altogether beginning the
year after any extended insolvency. Less competition and pricier plans could
lead fewer beneficiaries to opt into Medicare Advantage in the first place, and
reduce affordability or benefits for those who do. Meanwhile, some insurers
html [https://perma.cc/CTT8-FJN9] (noting that a nonprofit healthcare lobbying group opposed the
cuts to Medicare and the AHA lobbied against reductions on medical research due to the sequester).
257
See generally Isaac D. Buck, When Hospitals Sue Patients, 73 HASTINGS L.J. 191 (2022)
(describing the trend of hospitals turning to increasingly aggressive debt collection in the face of cuts,
to maintain their bottom lines).
258
The coronavirus shortfall saw an immediate spike in health care industry layoffs. See U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., NEWS RELEASE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY CLAIMS 1 (2020), https://
oui.doleta.gov/press/2020/032620.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVQ3-5WPC] (“Additional industries heavily
cited for the increases [in unemployment insurance claims] included the health care and social assistance . . . industries.”).
259
See Lorber, supra note 256 (warning that cuts will likely lead to a decrease in services).
260
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 254, at 1267 (outlining research about the effect of provider
Medicare reimbursement reductions on provider behavior that indicated that concentrated markets
respond by increasing private-sector reimbursement rates, while those in competitive markets find
ways to cut costs).
261
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(c)(2)(C) (mandating interest for late payments). From January 2021
through June 2021, the interest rate on late payments was 0.875%. Prompt Payment Interest Rate;
Contract Disputes Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,457, 7,458 (Jan. 28, 2021).
262
See Brent D. Fulton, Health Care Market Concentration Trends in the United States: Evidence
and Policy Responses, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1530, 1531 (2017) (discussing the trends of increasing concentration in health care markets, especially among primary care physicians).
263
BARAK D. RICHMAN, AM. ENTER. INST., BEYOND REPEAL AND REPLACE: CONCENTRATION
IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS: CHRONIC PROBLEMS AND BETTER SOLUTIONS 3–4 (2012), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163749 [https://perma.cc/9HB5-EFXU] (describing
market concentration and its effect on health care prices).
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might also face solvency challenges themselves as a result of disrupted reimbursement—though as discussed above, this impact would be reduced by the
fact that the HI Trust Fund is the source of only part of Medicare Advantage
plans’ Medicare payments.
Stepping back, the general trend that emerges from the broad range of
harms likely to stem from Medicare insolvency is that those harms would be
unfairly distributed. They would be borne disproportionately by certain providers, patients, and communities, based on their wealth and location, rather
than any considered design. Hospitals serving higher proportions of lowincome beneficiaries, as well as sole community and rural hospitals, would likely be put out of business, as they rely heavily on Medicare revenues. 264 Provider
cuts to charitable care and efforts to recoup revenues through aggressive debt
collection practices would fall most heavily on financially distressed patients, 265 as would increases in private-sector insurance rates. 266 Further, increased concentration in health care markets fueled by provider insolvencies,
exits, and well-resourced providers’ advantage in weathering a disruption
would exacerbate the distributional slant of the market concentration’s harms
described by Professor Clark Havighurst and Professor Barak Richman. 267
Establishing Medicare bankruptcy rules in advance by regulation or legislation would reduce this harm and unfairness in three ways. First, setting rules
in advance would dramatically shorten the interim period of uncertainty between the onset of insolvency and final judicial determination of rights and
responsibilities, as well as the costs associated with the transition. The law
could fully resolve all open questions presented by insolvency, including
whether claimants would be entitled to payment from general revenues of statSee Matthew Manary, Richard Staelin, William Boulding & Seth W. Glickman, Payer Mix &
Financial Health Drive Hospital Quality: Implications for Value-Based Reimbursement Policies, 1
BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2015, at 87, 91–92, https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/bsp_vol1issue1_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9WQ-UR69] (finding that hospital financial
outcomes are highly correlated with how large a percentage of private-payer patients the hospital
serves); Ron Shinkman, Safety Net Hospitals Hit Particularly Hard by COVID-19, Will Have to Cut
Future Spending, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/safetynet-hospitals-hit-particularly-hard-by-covid-19-cut-spending/592520/ [https://perma.cc/SAJ4-4DZ7]
(noting that “safety net hospitals” are especially dependent on Medicare and Medicaid payments).
265
Buck, supra note 257, at 211, 219 (outlining patient concerns of bankruptcy as a result of
medical expenses and discussing that hospital debt may cause patients to lose housing or fail to continue seeking out medical care).
266
Samantha Artiga, Petry Ubri & Julia Zur, The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing on LowIncome Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 1, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-premiums-and-cost-sharing-on-low-incomepopulations-updated-review-of-research-findings/ [https://perma.cc/F8ZF-KHAN] (“Premium effects
are largest for those with the lowest incomes, particularly among those with incomes below poverty.”).
267
See generally Havighurst & Richman, supra note 79 (describing the adverse distributive impacts of concentration in health care markets).
264
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utorily-mandated amounts if the trust fund became insolvent. This would result
in no transition costs at all—if claimants were guaranteed the payments they
are likely entitled to under current law, then the transition would be seamless
and insolvency harms avoided entirely. Even if the question of Judgment Fund
liability was unresolved, setting the other aspects of Medicare bankruptcy in
advance would allow claimants to sue as soon as insolvency arrived, streamlining litigation and allowing for a much quicker judicial resolution. For example,
if HHS simply issued a regulation in advance setting forth its planned approach, that regulation could serve as a vehicle for litigation. This would predictably permit litigation to proceed years before it could if HHS waited until
after insolvency to announce and implement a policy. 268
Second, a Medicare bankruptcy framework established in advance could
prioritize among claimants more freely than policy set on the eve of, or in the
midst of, insolvency. Protecting, for example, rural providers and those serving
disproportionate numbers of low-income and indigent patients would mitigate
the harms and unfairness of insolvency. As described in Section II.C, the agency’s legal authority to provide such insulation through guidance, last-minute
adjudication, or emergency rulemaking is constrained by the Medicare statute
as interpreted in 2019 by the United States Supreme Court in Azar v. Allina
Health Services. 269 This sets up a major advantage of advance establishment of
Medicare bankruptcy rules. It allows HHS (through notice and comment rulemaking) or Congress (through legislation) far greater leeway in insulating the
most vulnerable or deserving claimants from the effects of insolvency. 270
Third, establishing Medicare bankruptcy policy in advance would be fairer procedurally because legal policymaking processes are more participatory
than policy by agency fiat. Health justice “seek[s] to foster collective deliberation on . . . the reimbursement policies that will apply to various types of services and practitioners—as an expression and obligation of citizenship.” 271
Similarly, administrative law values have long emphasized the importance of
policymaking processes that offer opportunities for participation and accounta-

268
See supra notes 151–155 and accompanying text (contrasting the timeline of litigation challenging Medicare payment regulations to the timeline of litigation challenging Medicare payment
delays).
269
See 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1815–16 (2019) (requiring notice and comment rulemaking in a broader
array of circumstances); see also discussion supra Section II.C (discussing potential impediments to
HHS emergency action while administering Medicare insolvency).
270
See discussion supra Section II.C (discussing the advantages of advanced rulemaking regarding Medicare bankruptcy).
271
Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in
Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 888 (2016).
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bility. 272 Notice and comment rulemaking in advance of insolvency would offer such opportunities for participation, as would, of course, legislation. The
last-minute announcement of policy by agency fiat would not.
There is no knowing for sure how long insolvency in Medicare would last
if reached. If not established in advance, key questions about the program’s
operation and priorities decided through closed, non-participatory processes
could come to govern Medicare for years, or even indefinitely.
Finally, establishing Medicare bankruptcy policy in advance would reduce the harms and unfairness of insolvency. This holds true even if we relax
the assumption that status quo Medicare bankruptcy would follow the most
likely path—delayed payments, announced at the last minute, leading after
years of legal battles to court-ordered damages from the Judgment Fund. If
instead courts were ultimately to refuse to award damages, as might well happen, Congress might respond to such a refusal by stepping in to provide a
source of payment itself. 273 If this were the case, the result—payments being
made but only after years of disruption bringing serious and unfair harms—
would be the same, albeit reached through a different process.
If neither the courts nor Congress offered relief, the period when providers learned they would be forced to endure permanent reductions in necessary
sources of revenue would not directly impact the severity or distribution of
resulting harms. 274 Even in such a case, however, Medicare bankruptcy pursuant to rules set in advance would be fairer because HHS would still be able to
insulate financially vulnerable providers and insurers, as well as those meeting
critical community needs. That insulation would be even more important if
insolvency means a permanent, rather than a temporary, disruption in payments. And, even in such a case, Medicare bankruptcy pursuant to rules set in
advance would be fairer because HHS or Congress could still consider a broad
range of views in forming this “new structure” of the Medicare program.
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1928–
29 (2013) (considering the value of participation); Figley, supra note 203, at 208 (expressing concerns
about Judgment Fund appropriation from the perspective of administrative law values).
273
Cf. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 90 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the congressional waiver of the statute of limitations for particular civil rights claims), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
enforcement denied sub nom. Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
274
It might be that years of litigation during which ultimate payment was still expected might
give hospitals a chance to adapt to increased uncertainty in their revenue streams, mitigating impacts.
Cf. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, supra note
66, at 41 (“[T]he early introduction of reforms increases the time available for affected individuals and
organizations—including health care providers, beneficiaries, and taxpayers—to adjust their expectations and behavior.”). On the other hand, extending the period of uncertainty would also mean increasing the size of the accumulated shortfall hospitals would, in this scenario, unexpectedly become responsible for, exacerbating harms for hospitals who banked on a favorable result in Judgment Fund
litigation.
272
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B. Startling the Frog
Readers may at this point begin to wonder whether it is not just possible
but likely that Congress will decline to take major action to address the solvency of Medicare unless and until courts finally address Judgment Fund liability.
This would, at a minimum, entail the executive branch operating an insolvent
Medicare program for many months and, more likely, years (if not permanently). In prior work, I drew from the experience of past disappropriations the
following insight: the likelihood that Congress will take action to avoid a funding shortfall depends in part on how much certainty there is about the repercussions of a congressional failure to act. 275 A member’s willingness to address
a program’s financial woes—whether by raising taxes, reducing benefits,
drawing funds from another program, or borrowing—depends on what they
might be blamed for if they refuse to cast that vote. 276 The greater the uncertainty about the consequences of a funding shortfall, the easier it is for the
member to transfer blame to whoever resolves that uncertainty—whether the
executive branch or the courts. 277 Moreover, uncertain impacts make bargaining failure more likely by fueling behavioral biases, including optimism and
myopia, that inhibit compromise. 278
Although I did not address Medicare directly in my earlier article, Disappropriation, the program’s impending insolvency offers a straightforward application of this point. With all the current uncertainty about the consequences
of insolvency, a member of Congress could vote down Medicare solvency legislation and argue with a straight face they had done so to protect Medicare
beneficiaries from cuts or taxpayers from hikes. Further, such a member could
argue that their vote did not actually imperil providers or beneficiaries in their
district, even though it led to the program’s insolvency. They might assert, for
example, that their constituents should have been protected by the agency (by
insulating their payments) or by courts (by ordering damages from the Judgment Fund). Members reluctant to expend political capital, either for raising
revenue for Medicare or reducing expenditures, might see leaving this question
to the executive branch and courts in the first instance as a desirable option.
Indeed, that would be the prediction of Professor John Hart Ely’s famous—and
oft-evidenced—insight that a congressional desire to shift blame for difficult

275
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 70 (“[U]ncertainty . . . about consequences increases the likelihood of disappropriation . . . .”).
276
Id. at 60–61 (citing David Kamin, Legislating Crisis, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 34, 34
(Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017) .
277
Id. at 49–50.
278
Id. at 70.
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choices fuels statutory delegations and ambiguities. 279 From this perspective,
hard-to-trace, slow-developing impacts on competition, affordability, and access
to care that could be blamed on the executive branch and courts might be a
worthwhile price to pay for a politician worried about avoiding accountability
for cutting Medicare or other programs, raising taxes, or ballooning the deficit.
At the same time, the lack of any clear deadline for Congress to avert the
effects of insolvency would dilute pressure on leadership to bring such a bill to
the floor at all. 280 Simultaneously, optimistic providers, expecting success in
the courts, might be reluctant to support legislation addressing insolvency that
would also adversely impact their reimbursement rates. The result would limit
the range of possible insolvency legislation to bills that draw revenue from
other programs or that increase taxes, either of which might be blocked by opponents. Instead of a game of chicken, deliberations about whether and how to
address the solvency of the Medicare program may well look more like a game
of Russian roulette.
Compared to this current path, establishing a legal framework for Medicare bankruptcy would make insolvency less likely by reducing uncertainty
about the consequences of congressional inaction. 281 A legal framework for
Medicare bankruptcy would also make extended insolvency less likely by
shortening the period of uncertainty between the onset of insolvency and final
279
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132 (1980)
(first quoting 122 CONG. REC. 31,628 (1976) (statement of Rep. Elliott Levitas); and then quoting id.
at 31,622 (statement of Rep. Walter Flowers)) (explaining this dynamic). See generally JOSH
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
(2017) (describing the importance of expectations about which branch will be blamed in assessing
whether shutdowns further executive or legislative power).
280
Recent cliffs have seen searching attention into the actual, functional deadlines to avert negative impacts—and a reluctance in Congress to act until the very last minute, or soon after. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Chuck, Millions of Kids May Lose Health Insurance Over Missed Deadline by Congress,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/millions-kids-may-lose-healthinsurance-over-missed-deadline-congress-n820261 [https://perma.cc/D2WM-ZDXV] (reporting on
the lapse of CHIP authorization); Nicholas Wu & Christal Hayes, Congress Faces a Government
Shutdown if a Spending Deal Isn’t Reached This Week, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/07/government-shutdown-happen-if-congress-doesnt-actfriday/3856020001/ [https://perma.cc/GQ4F-KVJQ] (reporting on the failure to reach an agreement on
looming government shutdown); Caitlin Emma, Democrats Hurtle Toward Debt Deadline Without a
Clear Plan, POLITICO (June 24, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/24/democrats-debtceiling-deadline-495749 [https://perma.cc/D3WD-E47Q] (reporting on Democrats’ need to address
the debt ceiling within the quickly-approaching deadline).
281
The extent of this effect would depend on the degree to which the new framework answered
the open questions described in Part II. See discussion supra Part II. Specifically, it would depend on
whether any discretion left to HHS would need to be exercised in advance through notice and comment rulemaking, whether payments would be delayed or reduced, whether the agency could insulate
some claimants, and (either) whether the Judgment Fund would be available in the event of insolvency
or (more likely, given the probable difficulty of reaching compromise on that question) the procedural
route through which litigation to resolve the Judgment Fund question should proceed.
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resolution of open questions about the government’s obligations and claimants’
rights. 282
Furthermore, if this Medicare bankruptcy legal framework created a concrete deadline by which congressional action was necessary to avert undesirable impacts, actual insolvency would be less likely. A regulation or statute
could provide for reductions in Medicare reimbursements to be effective for an
entire fiscal year, unless preventive action were enacted by a certain date. This
would give all involved a clear deadline for congressional action to avert the
consequences of the upcoming year’s insolvency—minimizing the confusion
entailed in administering insolvency.
Despite these significant benefits of reduced likelihood of insolvency, it is
important to note that the effect of clarifying the consequences would not be
entirely positive. There could be two categories of cross-cutting effects, one
more troubling than the other. The first is that whatever benefits a legal framework for Medicare bankruptcy would have ex-post, openly contemplating the
effects of insolvency would increase its likelihood by making that result morally or normatively acceptable. It may be that the possibility of actually allowing
the program to become insolvent is seen as unacceptable or extreme, that this
taboo is on track to help overcome the current fiscal challenges, and that addressing the possibility in law might erode this salutary taboo. In short, perhaps today allowing Medicare to become insolvent is outside the “Overton
window” of politically-viable policy options, but addressing insolvency explicitly in law would expand that window. 283
Two considerations diminish the weight of this concern. First, under current law, members of Congress can easily allow Medicare to become insolvent
without ever taking action. For this taboo to do its work, a policy cliff must be
put in place that crystallizes the need to make a choice, forcing a vote in Congress that can be characterized as “for” or “against” insolvency. As just described, a major benefit of addressing insolvency by law, in advance, is that
doing so would set up such a vote by forcing clear deadlines to avoid impacts.
Second, addressing what happens in Medicare in the event the program
becomes insolvent would not necessarily make insolvency any less taboo. The
expressive function of law depends on its content, not just its subject matter.
Many laws address taboo or extreme outcomes—what to do if a person kills
To maximize this effect, Congress could facilitate prompt judicial resolution of open questions
by blessing the district court litigation path, and possibility of prospective relief, as an alternative to
Judgment Fund litigation.
283
See Daniel J. Morgan, The Overton Window and a Less Dogmatic Approach to Antibiotics, 70
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2439, 2439 (2020) (describing Joseph Overton’s “Overton window”
as the concept that “there are a range of ideas considered acceptable to the public” and that “[f]or an
idea to be politically viable, it needed to be within that range”).
282
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another, 284 what to do if a president commits a felony, 285 and, of course, what
to do if a municipality or individual becomes insolvent. 286 Thus, bankruptcy
scholars have explained that the extent to which bankruptcy laws lessen the
“stigma” surrounding personal financial distress, and therefore increase the
likelihood of bankruptcy, depends on the content of those laws, not just their
existence. 287 Following that same logic, concerns that addressing Medicare
insolvency in law would serve to legitimize it fall flat. Instead, these concerns
represent a reason to focus on the prefatory and expressive content of any law
addressing Medicare bankruptcy.
A second reason to worry that creating a legal framework might make
Medicare insolvency more likely is that, as described in Section III.A, it would
reduce the harms and unfairness of insolvency if it comes. 288 Surely the likelihood that Medicare becomes insolvent depends in part on the severity and distribution of the harms that would result if it does, such that reducing those
harms would make insolvency more likely. 289
The concern that establishing a legal framework for Medicare bankruptcy
would tend to make insolvency more likely by lessening the magnitude of its
predicted harms is legitimate, though normatively fraught. Nevertheless, this
assumes that such a framework could not preserve or even increase the deterrent effect of the threat of insolvency. The next section explains why this assumption is incorrect.
C. Medicare’s Least Cost Avoiders
In Disappropriation, I showed that reducing harms associated with congressional failure to fund an entitlement might make that failure more likely
because the harms associated with inaction factor into congressional decisionSee, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (defining murder); see also Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal
Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 476 (2003)
(“[W]hen lawmakers make law, they . . . hope to express certain social or cultural values they attach to
that behavior.”).
285
See, e.g., Restoring and Enforcing Accountability of Presidents (REAP) Act, H.R. 1153, 117th
Cong. § 2 (2021) (describing the consequences for a former president’s felony conviction).
286
See, e.g., Municipal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (describing the administration of
municipal insolvency).
287
See Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEVS. J. 481, 496–97 (2006) (noting how the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 may have
contributed to reduction in stigma surrounding personal bankruptcy by prohibiting discrimination
against those who have declared bankruptcy).
288
See discussion supra Section III.A (describing advanced Medicare insolvency planning as
harm reduction).
289
Whether Medicare actually becomes insolvent depends on many factors, the interaction of
which might be modeled in different ways. It is hard, however, to imagine a model predicting whether
the program will become insolvent in which the associated harms are not a paramount consideration.
284
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making. 290 Accordingly, I encouraged caution about reforms that reduce the
seriousness or credibility of the threat of disappropriation, while endorsing
unequivocally reforms that diminish the likelihood, but not the threat, of disappropriation. 291 The benefits of establishing a legal framework to govern
Medicare bankruptcy described in the last section—reducing the risk of bargaining failure in Congress—satisfy this criterion. But the benefits of establishing a legal framework described in Section A of this Part—that doing so
would reduce the severity and unfairness of the harms—do not. Reducing the
harms of insolvency would indeed reduce the severity of the threat of insolvency. It is therefore necessary to ask: Would a Medicare bankruptcy law’s
impact on the threat of insolvency ultimately be desirable, or not?
This is an important question, because the threat of insolvency in Medicare has played an influential role in health and welfare policy over the past
five decades, even though Medicare has never actually been insolvent. 292 The
risk of insolvency has acted as what Professor David Kamin (who is now Deputy Director of President Joseph Biden’s National Economic Council) terms a
“crisis device[].” 293 This legislatively-created trigger forces preemptive action,
pushing Congress to regulate on a subject it might otherwise leave alone at a
time when it might otherwise do nothing. 294
If Congress or HHS created a legal framework making insolvency effectively costless for everyone directly involved in the program—such as guaranteeing payment from general treasury revenues if the Trust Fund runs dry—
they would thereby make insolvency much more likely, not less. They would
truly make insolvency an accounting tool that operated merely as a “thermometer[]” on some Medicare costs. 295 This might well be a good thing, in which
case reducing the threat of insolvency is an end to be desired, and is an argument for, not against, legislation reducing insolvency’s costs. 296 This Article

Lawrence, supra note 11, at 67 (noting the distinction between durability and entrenchment).
Id. at 68–69.
292
See Jennifer Conley, Note, Medicare and Medical Tourism: Saving Medicare with a Global
Approach to Coverage, 21 ELDER L.J. 183, 185 (2013) (proposing reforms to “help save the Medicare
HI Trust Fund from going bankrupt”); Jost, Governing Medicare, supra note 79, at 68–69 (describing
the prominence of fiscal concerns in Medicare legislation); supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text
(describing legislation enacted to resolve past solvency crises).
293
Kamin, supra note 276, at 36; see also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 60.
294
Kamin, supra note 276, at 35.
295
MARMOR, supra note 8, at 136.
296
This Article has discussed several implications of the threat of insolvency for the functioning
of Medicare and the federal government, including effects on political support for Medicare and the
bargaining position of Medicare in budgetary debates in which Medicare is often pitted not only
against taxes but also against other spending programs, and the potential to combat the “moral hazard”
described here. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
290
291
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assumes, however, that insolvency will continue to entail harms, and that the
threat of insolvency will continue to play an important role in the program.
The creation of a legal framework governing Medicare bankruptcy presents the chance to calibrate those harms, not just reduce them. It thereby offers an opportunity to make the threat of insolvency more effective at prompting preventive action both in: (1) the short term (by better motivating compromises in Congress necessary to resolve insolvency crises); and (2) the long
term (by more powerfully steering Medicare policy to maintain solvency, preventing insolvency crises).
This point requires some unpacking. In theorizing how the risk of insolvency in Medicare might be assigned, it is helpful to conceptualize the insolvency of the Medicare program as analogous to that of a state or municipality.
Like a state or municipality, the Medicare program is a legal creation with constituents (providers and beneficiaries), assets (trust fund revenues), and a complex web of expenditures. Most crucially, a central focus of the municipal
bankruptcy literature is that of the often-problematic concept of “moral hazard.” 297 This principle asserts that if those who are responsible for the policy
direction of a municipality expect to receive the benefits of spending without
the costs, the municipality will spend more than it brings in, ultimately leading
to insolvency. 298 This concern is the most important source of reluctance
among scholars and policymakers for “bail[ing] out” insolvent municipalities. 299 They fear that by helping municipalities facing insolvency, the federal
government might inadvertently encourage other municipalities to put themselves in the same position. 300 Thus, a focus of this literature is to find ways
“to internalize” the costs of municipal profligacy by directing them toward the
voters and politicians responsible for municipal spending and revenue decisions. 301
Of course, Medicare is different from a municipality in important ways.
Relevant to the relationship between responsibility for the costs of insolvency,
on the one hand, and the likelihood of insolvency, on the other, is the question
297
See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996) (“What
moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of bad behavior, then you encourage that
bad behavior.” (quoting Jamea K. Glassman, Drop Budget Fight, Shift to Welfare, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1996, at B3)).
298
Schleicher, supra note 27, at 5–6 (discussing the federal government’s options in avoiding
state debt dilemmas).
299
Id. at 8.
300
Id.
301
See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012) (“The current legal structure . . . insulates local decisions from centralized influence and reduces the need for distressed localities to internalize the consequences of fiscal decisions.”).
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of moral hazard. Medicare policy is not determined directly by voters and its
expenditures benefit patients and health care industry participants, not residents.
So, who should bear the risk of insolvency in the program if we hope to use that
risk to combat moral hazard and ultimately make insolvency less likely?
Here, the concept of the “least cost avoider” developed initially in tort
law is helpful. A leading normative insight associated with the economic analysis of tort law is that liability for a risk ex-post should be assigned to whoever
is best positioned to manage that risk ex-ante. 302 Combining the moral hazard
concern of the municipal bankruptcy literature with the “least cost avoider”
concept from tort law presents a concrete prescription for the design of Medicare bankruptcy. If insolvency in Medicare is to carry harms, those harms
should be directed toward the “least cost avoider” for insolvency in the program. Who, then, is that?
It is doubtful that the asset-poor hospitals and financially-distressed patients who would be impacted most by a temporary disruption in Medicare
payments under current law are the program’s “least cost avoiders.” In other
words, it is doubtful that they are particularly well-positioned to protect the
program’s solvency either by influencing Medicare policy between insolvency
crises or by prompting necessary compromise to resolve those insolvency crises that do arise. As described above, the most economically-powerful hospitals would be least impacted by a disruption of months or even a few years. 303
This is especially true considering that Judgment Fund liability, if granted,
would ultimately come with a generous payment of interest. 304 Instead, the
most acute impacts would be on the least economically-powerful hospitals and
providers and, in turn, the low-income patients they serve. 305 This group’s lack
of economic strength alone makes it poorly positioned to protect Medicare’s
solvency, either by forcing necessary compromises in Congress or by steering
the program to adopt cost-cutting policies long term.
The threat of insolvency in Medicare would prompt congressional compromise and motivate reforms to protect the program’s long-term solvency if it
were directed instead at all hospitals and insurers, regardless of financial status. There would be a similar result were it expanded to target pharmaceutical
302
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (“Liability would be placed on the party initially free of responsibility
only if the decider found the benefits of avoidance (i.e., not incurring the cost of the accident) to be
greater than the costs of such avoidance to that party.”).
303
See supra notes 264–267 and accompanying text (noting the harms of abrupt Medicare insolvency would be unequally born by precarious providers serving vulnerable communities).
304
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(c)(2)(C) (charging interest to HHS for delayed Medicare payments to
providers).
305
See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing the inequitable distribution of harms resulting
from an unplanned Medicare insolvency).
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and device manufacturers as well (which would mean tying the threat of insolvency into Medicare Parts B and D, not just A and C). If Medicare is to feature
a threat of harm to someone in the event of insolvency, it should be the economically-powerful health care industry players whose lobbying influences the
short- and long-term course of the program. These include the hospital and
nursing home industry, the health insurance industry, and the pharmaceutical
and device manufacturing industry.
These industries represent three of the leading lobbying industries in the
country—in 2020 pharmaceutical companies were number one, hospitals were
number seven, and health insurers were number thirteen. 306 The significant
influence they play in the development of health policy has been studied in
depth by historians, 307 political scientists, 308 and law professors. 309
The risk of insolvency shared with the health care industry need not be
one-sided, limited to the downside risk of an insolvent Trust Fund. Hospitals,
insurers, and/or pharmaceutical companies might also be given “skin in the
game” of Medicare’s solvency. This might look like the promise of a positive,
upward adjustment in their payment rates, for example, to be triggered if, and
only if, the program’s solvency was projected to extend past ten years. 310
A positive adjustment would have significant benefits from a policy perspective, as well. Numerous scholars have noted that reducing health care costs
will be impossible unless pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and other
health care industry players can be incentivized to invest in technologies and
reforms that make health care cheaper in the long term. 311 Giving these indus306
Erin Duffin, Leading Lobbying Industries in the United States in 2020, by Total Lobbying
Spending, STATISTA (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/257364/top-lobbying-industriesin-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/8RLB-T986].
307
See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 401–02
(1982).
308
See, e.g., JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 144 (describing the role of health care industry lobbyists in drafting the Affordable Care Act and then in the development of regulations implementing its provisions, and their focus on costs); OBERLANDER, supra note 9.
309
See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in
Everything Else, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370, 371 (2010) (arguing that “misaligned economic incentives”
are to blame for the current state of the Medicare program).
310
Politically speaking, offering such a “benefit” might be necessary to overcome health care
industry players’ reluctance to support any Medicare bankruptcy framework that explicitly assigned
downside risk to the industry.
311
See Nicholas Bagley & Rachel E. Sachs, Limiting State Flexibility in Drug Pricing, 379 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1002, 1003 (2018) (describing how HHS’s denial of Massachusetts’s request to exclude
some drugs from Medicaid coverage was justified ex-post by reasoning eerily similar to that of the
pharmaceutical industry who also opposed the request); Bagley, supra note 20, at 533 (“[T]he urgent
and interesting question is . . . . [H]ow to yoke the immense network of Medicare’s private physicians
to a broader notion of public values, one that’s more attentive to questions of cost and quality.”); Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 65, at 992 (arguing that health care cost growth is driven in part by lack
of innovation incentives for cost-reducing drugs and technologies); William M. Sage, Be a Transfor-
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tries’ clear “skin in the game” of Medicare’s solvency, whether the program is
nearing insolvency or not, would offer a concrete fiscal means to that end. 312
Under such an arrangement they would have an immediate, present-day interest in policy, technological, or practice changes that predictably lower the program’s long-term costs.
That said, a Medicare bankruptcy framework need not be so ambitious to
make the threat of insolvency more effective. Explicitly addressing the impact
of insolvency on Medicare payments in advance would naturally re-direct its
harms by reducing temporary disruption to the extent it served as insolvency’s
most likely hazard. Policymakers concerned that doing so would take the
“teeth” out of the threat of insolvency could replace the current, uncertain
threat of probably temporary disruption with any cross-cutting, certain threat.
These might include a modest reduction in reimbursement rates for the duration of insolvency (akin to sequester), an automatic reduction of rates necessary to protect the program’s solvency (or perhaps automatically raising payroll taxes at the same time), 313 or the combination of negative and positive solvency adjustments just described.
This argument is not without its challenges. There are two significant reasons to doubt that an explicit Medicare bankruptcy framework would make the
threat of insolvency more effective than the current uncertain threat as a tool to
promote compromise and cost control. Despite this, upon further inspection,
neither actually undermines the case for such a framework.
To start, skeptics might argue that the extent to which tying hospital, insurance, and pharmaceutical reimbursements to Medicare’s solvency would
alter lobbying behavior—let alone the effects of that lobbying—is difficult to
predict. This argument applies to the current, uncertain threat too, however. It
is a reason to doubt that the threat of insolvency plays a useful role at all, not
an objection to the possibility of better targeting the threat if there must be one.
mational President, Mr. Biden: Launch a Commission to Create an Ethical Health Care System, BILL
OF HEALTH (May 4, 2021), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/04/biden-commissionethical-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/4CLA-YKJN] (“The U.S. health care system will not change
without permission from health professionals, especially America’s physicians.”).
312
This approach builds on proposals by Professor Nicholas Bagley and Professor Isaac Buck to
use law to give providers an interest in Medicare costs. Professor Bagley proposes that providers be
given such an interest through participation in contract organizations that themselves are financially
motivated. Bagley, supra note 20, at 521–23. Professor Buck proposes that providers be understood to
have a fiduciary duty to Medicare as a payer. Buck, supra note 20, at 1065. Neither proposal would
check the industry’s incentive to steer the development of Medicare policy and health care institutions
toward greater cost, but a solvency adjustment would.
313
The Affordable Care Act includes an analogous provision capping the net cost of premium tax
credits based on a fraction of gross domestic product. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)(III) (providing
an indexing provision triggered “only if” ACA subsidy costs “exceed[] an amount equal to 0.504
percent of the [GDP] for the preceding calendar year”).

1718

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63:1657

More fundamentally, experience supports the view that there would be at
least some incentive effect. There are numerous examples of changes in Medicare law altering the program’s political economy—changing who lobbies in
the program, and for what. The Trust Fund financing structure itself was intended to generate political buy-in for the program from constituents and voters, 314 and this is believed to have worked. 315 The “doc fix”—a statutorilyscheduled cut to provider reimbursements until its repeal in 2015—saw the
health care industry lobbying Congress every year for an extension through
legislation that served to force compromise from the industry.316 The Medicare
Modernization Act expanded privatization of Medicare, resulting in a powerful
lobby of insurers working to privatize Medicare further or make insurer payments more generous. 317 And the creation of the “Recovery Audit Contractor”
(RAC) program very clearly illustrated the endogeneity of law to economics
and economics to politics. This pilot program created RACs, private entities
314
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it regarding the Social Security trust fund financing
structure on which Medicare’s is based: “We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the
contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pension[s] . . . .” JOST, supra note 125, at
50 (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt) (citing 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308–09 (1959)); OBERLANDER, supra note 9, at 80
(quoting same); see also JOST, supra note 125, at 50 (“Protecting the Medicare program from future
political attack was one factor motivating the trust fund financing of the program.” (citing ERIC M.
PATASHNIK, PUTTING TRUST IN THE US BUDGET: FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS AND THE POLITICS OF
COMMITMENT 96 (2000))).
315
JOST, supra note 125, at 51 (“[T]rust fund financing of the program has both contributed to the
sense of ownership that beneficiaries have in the program and to the reliance that Americans place in
its continued existence.” (citing Eric Patashnik & Julian Zelizer, Paying for Medicare: Benefits,
Budgets, and Wilbur Mills’s Policy Legacy, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 7 (2001))).
316
See Stuart Guterman, The “Doc Fix”—Another Missed Opportunity, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2261, 2262–63 (2014) (describing how numerous small cuts were imposed “to offset the cost” of
year-long delay in “[d]oc [f]ix” in 2014); J. Michael McWilliams, MACRA: Big Fix or Big Problem?,
167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 122, 122 (2017) (noting that significant permanent change in Medicare
reimbursement, MACRA, was enacted in exchange for change in law permanently eliminating the
“doc fix”).
317
See, e.g., Fred Schulte, Medicare Advantage Lobbying Machine Steamrolls Congress, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 10, 2014), https://publicintegrity.org/health/medicare-advantage-lobbyingmachine-steamrolls-congress/ [https://perma.cc/9RD4-KMNB] (“The top 10 Medicare Advantage
companies in terms of enrollment unleashed as many as 145 lobbyists in 2013 . . . . [Trade group]
AHIP spent nearly $2.5 million in the first quarter of 2013 lobbying senators and congressmen on
health care issues . . . .”). That said, a group’s incentive to lobby for changes that benefit its members
depends on a variety of factors. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing the collective action challenge
to interest group mobilization and approaches by which that challenge may be overcome as well as pointing to the AMA as an organization that surmounted collective action challenges through provision of
selective benefits). Additionally, there are indications that the cohesiveness of the insurance lobby has
begun to deteriorate. See Bob Herman, Big Insurer Defections Signal AHIP’s Fading Clout, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160109/MAGAZINE/3010
99969/big-insurer-defections-signal-ahip-s-fading-clout [https://perma.cc/W2U7-B92P] (noting the
departures of Aetna, Inc. and United Healthcare, Inc. from the trade group).
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promised a share of any hospital overpayments they identify.318 When the time
came to consider extending the program, the RAC lobby had a seat at the table,
arguing for an extension. 319
Taking a different tack, a reader persuaded that Medicare bankruptcy
rules could more effectively target the threat of insolvency may doubt that the
economically powerful industry players can be reined in, given their power.
Would not hospitals, insurers, and pharmaceutical companies ensure that they
would be better off, not worse, under any Medicare bankruptcy framework? In
other words, does this possibility run afoul of Professor Eric Posner’s and Professor Adrian Vermeule’s “inside/outside fallacy,” which highlights the difficulty of effectuating public-interested changes through a system governed by
self-interested actors? 320
As a preliminary matter, this objection is a reason to worry that a Medicare bankruptcy framework tailored to address the threat of insolvency may
not come to fruition, but it is not a reason not to try. This objection also assumes that Medicare bankruptcy rules would make health care industry players
worse off, but that is not necessarily true. As illustrated by the positive solvency adjustment, such rules need not necessarily reduce the expected profits of

Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) are private entities that enter contracts with Medicare to
review provider claims and identify overpayments. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT: CONTRACTORS AND CMS’S ACTIONS TO ADDRESS
IMPROPER PAYMENTS, REFERRALS OF POTENTIAL FRAUD, AND PERFORMANCE 1 (2013). For every
overpayment an RAC identifies, it receives a fee. Id. at 2. RACs were created by Congress as an experimental way to identify and address waste in the Medicare program. Id. at 1. They were “successful,” in the sense that they identified many, many instances of overpayment, but problematic because
they also falsely flagged many other provider claims, ultimately flooding the Medicare hearing system
with provider appeals. STAFF OF U.S. S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 113TH CONG, IMPROVING AUDITS: HOW WE CAN STRENGTHEN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 19–22
(Comm. Print 2014). That led Congress to pause the program for the purpose of re-evaluating it, before ultimately, in a pitched political battle, re-authorizing it in part. See Press Release, Council for
Medicare Integrity, FY2015 RAC Report to Congress: Recoveries Decline Due to Program Pause
(Dec. 12, 2016), [https://perma.cc/VMU4-XU59] (noting that “Medicare recoveries decreased by 91
percent due to constraints placed on the RAC program”).
319
The RAC program’s history is a perfect example of the endogeneity of politics to law. Before
the program was first created, there were no RACS; the cottage industry did not even exist. But once
created by law, the program took on a life of its own. The RACs formed into an association, the
American Coalition for Healthcare Claims Integrity, that itself is now an active lobbyist, participating
before Congress and HHS in discussions of the future of the program that created them. See Michelle
M. Stein, Spending Bill Bashes RACs, Hits CMS and OMHA Over Appeals Backlog, INSIDE CMS,
Dec. 18, 2014, at 1, 1 (“[T]he American Coalition for Healthcare Claims Integrity, which represents
RACs, slammed appropriators for being sympathetic to providers . . . .”).
320
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743,
1745, 1789, 1796 (2013) (noting that in proposing changes to a system to alter the behavior of actors
within that system, an “analyst must then confront the . . . question whether any relevant actors have
both the capacity and motivation to change the rules of the system”).
318
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hospitals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, or insurers—they need only change
where and how they expect to make them.
Furthermore, this objection also assumes that industry players’ ability to
influence the formation of Medicare policy would translate into rules governing the administration of insolvency, but again this is not necessarily true. Industry players’ ability to win policy fights, besting counteracting fiscal and
beneficiary interests, has historically been at its lowest ebb in the midst of insolvency crises. 321 Every insolvency crisis offers momentum for administrative
change. 322 It also offers an opportunity for significant legislative change in
Medicare that, absent reforms to the filibuster, an electoral landslide, or a fix
capable of passage through reconciliation, would be difficult to achieve. 323
Special interests with the power to block structural “change” may well lack the
power to dictate its terms if it is forced upon them. 324 As many key levers of
power in the federal system, from the filibuster to rulemaking, operate as “vetogates,” they give those who control them the ability to block changes from
the status quo, not to steer changes when they must be made. 325 Medicare’s
current insolvency crisis therefore may offer an opportunity for reforms that
might be impossible in a non-crisis environment.
Finally, looking beyond Medicare, the possibility elaborated in this Part
represents a novel means of overcoming a thorny problem at the heart of much
scholarship on law and political economy. In short, it is an opportunity to overcome the distorting influence of economic interests in the policymaking and
political processes. 326 Scholars are pessimistic about the prospects of preventing economically powerful interests from influencing regulatory and legislative processes. 327 Connecting the revenues of health care industry players to
Medicare costs would accept the influence of hospitals, insurers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the political and regulatory processes as inevitable.
JOST, supra note 125, at 78.
See generally Frank & Neuman, supra note 7 (recounting past instances of Medicare insolvency and suggesting solutions for the next crop of reforms).
323
See generally MOLLY E. REYNOLDS, EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: THE POLITICS OF FILIBUSTER
LIMITATIONS IN THE U.S. SENATE (2017) (evaluating circumstances in which special rules allows the
senate majority to bypass the filibuster).
324
See Jost, Governing Medicare, supra note 79, at 80 (“[T]hough interest groups generally have
limited success in effectuating Medicare policy initiatives, they are much more successful in blocking
or delaying change.” (first citing CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING
HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH POLICY 104 (1996); and then citing KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986))).
325
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1443–46 (2008) (identifying nine “vetogates” throughout the legislative process).
326
See generally Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 23 (describing the field).
327
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV.
131, 148 (2005) (describing a “hydraulics” effect whereby “[l]egal constriction of” one means of translating economic power into political power simply pushes the powerful to utilize alternative such means).
321
322
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Simultaneously, it would temper this “problem” by redirecting that influence
toward salutary ends.
IV. WHO DECIDES?
This Part assumes the goal of establishing rules for Medicare bankruptcy
and addresses a final, “[l]egal [p]rocess” question: Who decides? 328 What role
should HHS, Congress, and the courts play in establishing rules for Medicare
bankruptcy? Section A explains that although any clarification is helpful, from
the standpoint of the likelihood, harm, and effectiveness of insolvency, it
would be advantageous for Congress, rather than HHS, to set Medicare bankruptcy rules. 329 Section B turns to the secondary role of courts, describing the
implications for Medicare bankruptcy of two cases that the Supreme Court is
expected to consider in spring of 2022. 330
A. Legislation Is Preferable to Regulation
As described above, establishing Medicare bankruptcy rules could be
beneficial whether done through regulation or legislation, and whether those
rules addressed only some or all of the open questions discussed in Part II. 331
Either regulation or legislation would reduce uncertainty about the effects
of Medicare bankruptcy. This would both encourage whoever stands to lose
during insolvency to work to prevent that result and reduce the risk of failure
in bargaining over a solution. 332 Either process would also mitigate the confusion and chaos that would result from insolvency as well as the attendant harm
to Americans’ confidence in their institutions, Medicare in particular. 333 And
either process would hasten the ultimate resolution of legal challenges prompted by insolvency, reducing the unfairness of its impacts for resource-poor hospitals and insurers. 334
At this writing, insolvency is imminent, so the regulatory course is most
likely the path of least resistance. The agency should proceed with setting forth
328
See Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1389, 1450 (2010) (citing HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM) (explaining that “a defining feature of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm and the
Legal Process school is that they . . . focus . . . on second-order questions of ‘who decides?’” (citing
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964
(1994))).
329
See infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text.
330
See infra notes 345–363 and accompanying text.
331
See discussion supra Part II.
332
See discussion supra Sections III.B, III.C.
333
See discussion supra Section III.A.
334
See discussion supra Section III.A.
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a Medicare bankruptcy plan by notice and comment rulemaking as soon as
possible. In any event it should be no later than the annual spring and summer
payment notices it will issue in the fiscal year preceding insolvency. 335 At the
very least, doing so would make the deadline for congressional action and the
consequences of inaction clear to Congress and the public.
Whether Congress enacts a short-term patch of one or two years or a
longer-term fix, it should include a provision establishing a failsafe framework
for administering insolvency, should it arise in the future. It should do so regardless of whether the agency promulgates a rule governing insolvency. This is because legislation governing Medicare bankruptcy would carry several advantages over regulation.
As a vehicle for lawmaking, legislation avoids two irreducible sources of
uncertainty in regulation. First is the possibility of change. Regulations can be
changed more easily than legislation, and often are when presidential administrations transition. 336 The possibility of change would dilute the ex-ante incentive effects of a Medicare bankruptcy regulation. This is because the incentive to act today to avoid a legal outcome tomorrow is only as strong as the
actor’s expectation that the law will still be in effect tomorrow. 337 Second is the
likelihood of legal challenge. Regulations carry a risk of invalidation in court
on statutory authority or administrative law grounds. This threat is impossible
to eliminate until insolvency actually occurs, due to federal court justiciability
doctrines. 338 Legislation can be challenged only on constitutional grounds, and
so carries much less litigation risk.
Further, legislation brings legitimacy that regulation lacks. Legislation is
made through the constitutionally-appointed mechanism of bicameral approval
by elected representatives, followed by presentment to an elected President—
the hallmark of democratic accountability. 339 Although the transparency and
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(j)(5) (requiring final hospital payment notice to be “publi[shed] in the
Federal Register[] on or before August 1 before each fiscal year,” necessitating notice of a proposed rule
in spring); id. § 1395w-23(b)(1)(B)(i)–(2) (requiring advance notice and comment on changes in Medicare Advantage payment methodology “[a]t least 45 days . . . before” final rule to be issued by “the
first Monday in April before the calendar year concerned”); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
336
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,009, 86 Fed. Reg. 7793, 7793 (Jan. 28, 2021) (ordering agencies
to “review all existing regulations” for possible changes the day after President Biden’s inauguration).
Statutes can be changed, of course, but unlike a regulation, statutory changes require action not only
by the executive branch but also the House and the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring action by both houses of the legislature as well as the executive branch to make law).
337
David S. Law, The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments, 40
GA. L. REV. 407, 415–16 (2006) (describing a need “to ensure the government’s ability to make persuasive commitments”).
338
See supra notes 151–155 and accompanying text (describing the ripeness doctrine).
339
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he ap335
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regularity of this process varies greatly,340 legislation carries inherent legitimacy by virtue of these democratic and constitutional bona fides. 341
The legitimacy benefits of legislation would be especially important for
Medicare bankruptcy as it addressed the Judgment Fund question and targeted
the risk of insolvency. Congress is better suited than HHS to make the highstakes tradeoffs that this question demands. These include weighing the interests of younger generations, taxpayers, and other programs, on the one hand,
and the interests of Medicare claimants and beneficiaries, on the other. HHS’s
expertise does not include the resolution of such inter-generational, inter-class,
and inter-industry tradeoffs. 342 Thus, although the details of Medicare bankruptcy certainly raise technical questions well-suited for HHS—questions that
Congress could well leave to the agency—the broad contours do not.
Finally, legislation is preferable to regulation because Congress could do
things that HHS could not under current law. Most importantly, Congress
could freely dictate the target of the risk of insolvency, placing that risk on the
actors best-positioned to prompt compromise in Congress and cost control in
health care. 343 Additionally, Congress could insulate the most vulnerable hospitals and communities, whereas HHS would be more limited in doing so. 344
B. Predictability and Judicial Review
In a statutory program like Medicare, courts do not make rules, they interpret them. Part II presented the judicial role as something of a wildcard. 345
Under current law, insolvency would leave courts with a lot of work to do. Important questions courts might face include: (1) HHS’s authority to adjust
payment rates for insolvency; (2) its authority to triage among claimants; (3)
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.”).
340
See Gluck et al., supra note 133, at 1865 (noting “great variation” in pathways legislation
takes to enactment).
341
See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 276 (2004) (“The connection between participation and legislative legitimacy is a strong one.”).
342
Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (discussing reasons “fundamental policy” judgments should be made by Congress
rather than agencies).
343
See supra notes 297–305 and accompanying text (using the concepts of least cost avoider and
moral hazard to determine proper risk allocation in Medicare bankruptcy).
344
For example, HHS’s adjustment authority would permit it to tailor any insolvency adjustment
for hospitals, but would not permit the agency to direct any of the risk of insolvency to pharmaceutical
companies, as doing that requires connecting insolvency to Medicare Parts D and B for the first time.
See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (describing extent of and limitations on HHS adjustment authority).
345
See discussion supra Part II (noting that courts have little guidance in administering insolvency at present).
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the availability of judicial relief; (4) which court would hear insolvency
claims; and (5) the applicability of various justiciability doctrines to different
potential agency choices. 346 Although Part II predicted how courts would resolve these open questions using interpretation and precedent, the lack of explicit law made those predictions unavoidably tentative. 347
As explained by this Article, uncertainty is itself a problem, and reducing
it would make Medicare insolvency less unfair, less harmful, less likely, and
more effective. Although HHS and Congress must do the important work to
reduce the uncertainty surrounding Medicare bankruptcy, courts nonetheless
can help by respecting predictability as a particularly important value in the
Medicare program. Specifically, in resolving Medicare controversies, courts
should consider whether the precedents they set will make Medicare’s administration more predictable in the future, and should favor doctrines that promote predictability.
There are firm bases in law for courts to emphasize predictability in resolving Medicare cases. In some places, predictability is directly relevant to
existing doctrinal balancing tests. 348 The value of predictability can also be
inferred from the structure of the Medicare statute. 349 As I have written elsewhere, Congress relinquishes its “power of the purse” when it creates a mandatory entitlement like Medicare, so choosing to do so manifests a congressional
intent to prioritize reliance. 350 Uncertainty about the existence or scope of
rights and obligations under the statute undermines reliance, whereas clarity
promotes it. Finally, as a general matter, predictability is not a value foreign to
judicial consideration; quite the opposite, “courts routinely fashion rules and
doctrines that encourage predictability.” 351
See discussion supra Part II (describing the important determinations courts will most likely
be faced with making while administering a Medicare insolvency).
347
See discussion supra Part II (conceding that a lack of explicit guidance makes any predictions
regarding the outcome of litigation purely speculative).
348
Predictability is directly relevant to the ripeness doctrine’s “hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see discussion supra Section III.A (describing the harms of a
delay in resolution). And the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Massachusetts cited the uncertainty of waiting on resolution of the state’s Medicaid challenges in the Court of Federal Claims as a reason that
forum was “inadequate” for purposes of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 487 U.S. 879, 905
(1988) (finding that prospective relief was necessary in light of the “complex ongoing relationship
between” the states and the federal government).
349
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (requiring payment to providers irrespective of congressional
appropriation); id. § 1395u(c)(2) (mandating the timely payment of claims).
350
See Matthew B. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70
DUKE L.J. 1057, 1073, 1077, 1093 (2021) (“But when Congress creates a permanent appropriation, it
destroys that power to refuse funding as it applies to the subject of the appropriation.”).
351
Knopf v. Esposito, No. 17cv5833, 2021 WL 867584, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (first
citing Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403 (2020); then citing Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90,
346
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This predictability criterion may seem abstract compared to the prior discussion in this Article. Yet, this is a necessary reflection of how courts bound
by the rule of law would engage with questions about the modalities of doctrinal and interpretive argument. It would, despite its abstraction, have concrete,
determinative implications for the adjudication of individual Medicare controversies, as well as for the program’s potential insolvency.
Contrasting two looming Supreme Court cases illustrates this point. In July 2021, the United States Supreme Court surprised the health policy world by
taking up two significant Medicare cases that it later heard in fall 2021: Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation (Empire Health), and American Hospital
Ass’n v. Becerra (AHA). 352 Empire Health challenges HHS’s calculation of
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments, 353 and AHA challenges
HHS’s adjustment of 340B payments to hospitals. 354 Neither Empire Health
nor AHA is specifically about Medicare bankruptcy. Even so, the Supreme
Court’s resolution of a key question regarding the Chevron deference in Medicare could profoundly influence the likelihood and course of insolvency, as
well as demonstrate the importance of the predictability criterion.
The applicability of Chevron deference to HHS’s interpretations of the
Medicare statute is at issue in both Empire Health and AHA. Commentators
have looked to these cases as a potential Chevron killer, speculating about
whether the Court may use the cases to invalidate or hobble the doctrine. 355
This line of thinking assumes that Chevron applies across-the-board to the
Medicare statute. Support for this assumption comes from circuit court statements and decisions applying Chevron to interpretations of the Medicare statute, or even indicating that heightened deference is owed to such interpreta104–05 (2d Cir. 2007); then citing Manning v. Utils. Mut. Ins. Co., 254 F.3d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 2001);
then citing Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1988); and then citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Tr. Co. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 140 N.E.3d 511, 518 (N.Y. 2019)) (“[L]itigation is less expensive and
more efficient when there is predictability . . . .”); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence,
and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1461 (2005) (endorsing “consistent[] appl[ication of] interpretive guides that advance continuity and coherence”). See generally Evan H. Caminker, Precedent
and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1994) (recommending that courts focus on predictability in developing jurisprudence).
352
Thomas Barker, Supreme Court Will Hear Several Health Care Cases in 2022 Term, JDSUPRA
(July 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-will-hear-several-health-7051728/
[https://perma.cc/5XUJ-RXY2] (reporting on cases the Supreme Court has scheduled for the 2022
term); see also Empire Health Found. v. Azar, 958 F.3d 873 (9th Cir., 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 967 F.3d 818
(D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021).
353
See generally 958 F.3d at 873.
354
See generally 967 F.3d at 818.
355
Lydia Wheeler, Chevron Deference Scope Tested in Supreme Court Medicare Case, BLOOMBERG L. (May 21, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/high-court-medicarepayments-case-challenges-agency-deference [https://perma.cc/RS6B-UEGA].
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tions. 356 As I explain in Congress’s Domain, however, Chevron deference to
permanent spending provisions, such as the Medicare statute, raises a unique
set of separation of powers questions that may warrant distinctive treatment. 357
The Court’s resolution of the deference question in each case could have
significant implications for Medicare bankruptcy. Empire Health grows out of
a dispute about who is “entitled to” Medicare benefits within the meaning of
the statute. 358 This is the sort of question whose resolution could have implications for the $5.3 trillion dollar Judgment Fund question. 359 As to that question,
deference would undermine predictability. Judicial deference regarding the
Medicare “entitlement,” applied in the case of insolvency, would mean that the
availability of the judgment fund—and so the future of the Medicare program—could change from administration to administration. It may even become a partisan question in future elections. Deference to the agency’s resolution of that question would thereby increase and prolong the uncertainty surrounding the effects of insolvency. It would not eliminate the possibility of
courts rejecting the agency’s resolution, but would ensure that, if the courts
accepted it, that interpretation would remain subject to change by the executive
branch at any time. 360
Meanwhile, AHA hinges on the meaning of a statutory condition on the
agency’s authority to set reimbursement rates for hospitals participating in the
340B drug discount program. 361 This case presents potential future implications for the agency’s claimant triage authority. If deference is unavailable to
the agency when it exercises explicit authority, it would be substantially limited in its ability to insulate claimants from the effects of insolvency, and to
See, e.g., Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“The Broad deference of Chevron is even more appropriate in cases that involve a ‘complex and
highly technical regulatory program,’ such as Medicare . . . .” (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994))).
357
Lawrence, supra note 350, at 1106 (“[P]ermanent appropriations provisions shrink Congress’s
domain.”).
358
See 958 F.3d at 885–86 (analyzing and interpreting the meaning of the words “entitled to”
within 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)).
359
See discussion supra Section II.C (contemplating whether the Judgment Fund might be available to satisfy Medicare claims during insolvency).
360
See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015) (refusing deference to the agency interpretation of the ACA on the “question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” that was “central to
[the] statutory scheme” (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014))).
361
See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 967 F.3d 818 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021). The specific statutory question is whether the
agency may adjust average acquisition cost-based reimbursement rates based on participation in the
340B program, notwithstanding the statute’s explicit provision for hospital-specific adjustments when
the agency has collected “hospital acquisition cost survey data.” § 1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(I); see Am.
Hosp. Ass’n, 967 F.3d at 828 (“[T]he sole question before us is whether HHS had statutory authority
to . . . . ‘[A]djust[]’ the amounts ‘as necessary for purposes of this paragraph.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(II)))).
356
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reduce the harms of insolvency by addressing it through ex-ante rulemaking.362
Moreover, in this case, deference would promote predictability. The agency
already has discretion to set payment rates; refusing deference would not change
that. But, providing deference would mean that the odds of judicial invalidation
would be greatly reduced when the agency exercises that authority.
The predictability criterion, therefore, supports a nuanced approach to
Chevron’s applicability to the Medicare statute, rather than a one-size-fits all
approach. As to a binary question like eligibility or entitlement, over which the
agency does not already have discretion, deference would undermine predictability. When it comes to the inherently continuous and variable question of the
extent of the agency’s authority to adjust Medicare payment rates, on the other
hand, deference would promote predictability.
This resolution of the deference questions in both AHA and Empire Health,
grounded in inferences about congressional intent drawn from the Medicare
statute, would honor the Court’s instruction in United States v. Mead Corp. “to
tailor deference to variety.” 363 It would also allow the Court to resolve both cases
on Medicare-specific grounds consistent with Mead that would not require the
Court to affirm, reject, or otherwise weigh in on the future of Chevron more generally. Finally, it would begin to shift the role of courts in the development of
Medicare from wildcard (and one-way ratchet) to peacemaker.

See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.C (describing agency statutory authorities).
533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001) (first citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000);
then citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991), superseded by statute, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511–13 (2006); then citing
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589–91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); then
citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 259–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); and then citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453–55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
In the nomenclature of Mead, the leading case in which Justice Breyer articulated a broad, intentfocused test for the applicability of Chevron, the fact that the legal question in Empire Health pertains
to who is entitled to Medicare benefits is an indication that Congress did not “expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law,” on that question. Id. at 229 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). It is such a question because the core purpose of creating an
entitlement—despite the inherent downsides of legally entrenching a benefit due to reduced flexibility
and congressional power—is “to engender reliance,” but Chevron deference destroys reliance as to
questions to which it applies by removing the solidifying force of stare decisis in favor of executive
discretion and the whims of the political process; thus, deference should be unavailable for that question. Lawrence, supra note 350, at 1093. At the same time, the fact that the legal question in AHA is
one on which Congress explicitly granted the agency policy discretion—the setting of reimbursement
rates for 340B hospitals—is an indication that Congress did indeed “expect the agency to . . . speak
with the force of law” on that question. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
Thus, deference should be available in the one case, but not the other.
362
363
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with the fable of the boiled amphibian, comparing the
metaphorical frog to Medicare. Of course, this analogy is oversimplified. As
this Article has explained, the health and welfare of the entire country is at risk
in Medicare’s looming insolvency. Additionally, the speed and nature of the
boil—whether insolvency has a clear deadline, whether it comes about, who it
harms, and how long the uncertainty surrounding it would last—is not some
unalterable, exogenous force. The determinants and consequences of insolvency in Medicare are a function of law, meaning we can change them. The adoption of explicit rules addressing Medicare bankruptcy would make insolvency
less unfair, less harmful, less likely, and more effective as a tool for forcing
compromise and controlling health care costs. HHS, Congress, and courts
should all work toward this goal. If successful, they would change the health
care system for the better, while demonstrating that the endogeneity of politics
to law can be not only a liability, but also an asset in institutional design.

